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Abstract 
 
The WirelessHART is a new standard for Industrial Process Automation and Control, 
formally released in September 2007. WirelessHART specifications are very well 
organized in all aspects except security as there are no separate specifications that 
document security requirements, the security is limited and spread throughout the 
WirelessHART specifications, and it is hard to understand the employed security without 
reading all the core specifications. This report will provide a comprehensive overview of 
WirelessHART security, the provided security mechanisms will be analyzed against the 
possible threats and the solutions will be proposed for the identified shortcomings. The 
report work also comprises of the ways to integrate the WirelessHART network with the 
legacy HART network. Different integration options are provided and each differs with 
the kind of legacy HART network already in use. A secure way of integrating HART and 
WirelessHART is also proposed by enhancing the capabilities of Adapters and 
connecting them with the HART Masters rather than slave devices. Finally the 
architecture of such a Security Manager will be proposed which will be capable of 
securing the entire WirelessHART network. A comprehensive and secure key 
management system is proposed which is capable of random key generation, secure 
key storage and retrieval, secure and automatic key renewal, timely key revocation, and 
efficient key distribution. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) is a kind of Wireless Ad hoc Network where almost 
all nodes are static but all have routing capabilities. There are many applications for WMNs 
especially in process automation industry where there is need for secure reliable communication 
with high bandwidth. WirelessHART is the only standardized solution to provide secure, reliable, 
and scalable communication in process automation industries. WirelessHART is WMN standard 
in a wireless sensor based environment.  
This chapter will give you general overview of the thesis. It will start with some 
background and then give a formal statement of problem, the goals, and the methodology used. 
Later in the chapter, we will explain the scope of this report and its boundaries. The outline of the 
report will be explained at the end.  
1.1. Background 
With the advent of Highway Addressable Remote Transducer (HART) in mid-1980s 
and its standardization in 1986, the industrial process automation systems continued to 
develop and flourish. HART hybrid (analog + digital) functioning and bi-directional 
operating capabilities at 4-20mA signal have made HART one of the most prevailing 
industrial protocols. Currently, HART Communication Foundation (HCF) [1] is actively 
governing HART Protocol. Recently, HCF released HART 7 as wireless extension to 
legacy HART Protocol and formally named it WirelessHARTTM. 
WirelessHART (HART 7.1) is a brand new Multihop Wireless Mesh Network 
Standard for Industrial Process Automation and Control, formally released in June 2008. 
International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) has approved it as an open standard 
on September 19, 2008. Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN) is an active research area in 
IT. There were no standards in WSN until recently when HCF announced 
WirelessHART. WirelessHART is specifically designed for industrial process automation 
that can be applied in monitoring and control applications e.g.: Asset management, 
process and equipment monitoring, diagnostics and maintenance, etc. 
WirelessHART specifications are very well organized in all aspects except 
security as there are no separate specifications that document security requirements, 
and security is spread throughout the WirelessHART specifications. Furthermore, the 
security at Application Layer is not specified by the standard. The Key Management 
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(generation, storage, revocation, and renewal) for all the required keys is left unspecified 
in the standard. 
WirelessHART is claimed to be a secure protocol but some of the basic security 
requirements are unaddressed in the standard, including: complete end-to-end security 
while integrating WirelessHART with HART; secure communication between 
WirelessHART devices and Plant Automation Application Hosts; key management; etc. 
The WirelessHART standard only provides Authentication and limited Confidentiality 
services at Data-Link Layer and Network Layer level, by using same keys for both 
Authentication and Confidentiality. 
 The motive of this thesis is to thoroughly analyze the security requirements for 
WirelessHART and fill the gap between what is available (regarding security), what is 
incomplete, and what is left for the user to propose and design. Although we will discuss 
the security issues in WMN, our main focus will be WirelessHART. 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
Investigating, analyzing, and specifying the secure communication 
mechanisms in Multihop Wireless Mesh Networks (WirelessHART) and 
integrating it with the Legacy HART Protocol and providing all-round 
Security Manager for key management that meets the requirements of 
both the wireless and the backend wired network. 
1.3. Project Goals 
 The goal for this project is to investigate the provided security in the 
WirelessHART standard and securely integrate the wireless (WirelessHART) technology 
with the wired technology (HART)-that is already in the market since 1980s. 
Furthermore, the project will design and Implement Security Manager for the 
WirelessHART. The ultimate goal is to analyze the provided security mechanisms 
against the standard security services including: Confidentiality and Privacy, Integrity, 
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting for an integrated (wireless and wired) 
network. The concrete goals of the project include: 
 Analysis of Security mechanisms in the WirelessHART Standard and 
identification of loop holes. The security solutions for the identified shortcomings 
will be proposed (This in itself is a very enterprising task as we will be the first to 
do security analysis of WirelessHART).  
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 The integration of the secured WirelessHART network with the unsecured wired 
HART network. Security in WirelessHART is built-in at Data-Link and Network 
Layer level while HART is not secured at any level.  
 The WirelessHART standard does not provide key management mechanisms. 
So, the major portion of the thesis will include such a key management (key 
generation, storage, distribution, renewal, revocation, and scalability) system that 
fulfills the requirements of all the meshes: IEEE 802.15.4-2006 based 
WirelessHART Networks; IEEE 802.11 and/or IEEE 802.1 Networks for Gateway 
- Network Manager communication, Gateway - Plant Automation Application 
Hosts communication, and Security Manager - Network Manager communication; 
and HART Network. 
 Thesis work will also include the implementation of the WirelessHART Security 
Manager that will fulfill the need of both the wireless and core/wired part of the 
WirelessHART network. 
 The thesis will be a comprehensive document that will address WirelessHART 
Security at all levels, and it can later be redesigned for inclusion as “Security 
specifications” in the WirelessHART standard (This is no doubt the desire of 
HART Communication Foundation and many other organizations that want to 
implement WirelessHART). 
1.4. Research Method 
As the WirelessHART has just entered the market, there are two or three 
research articles available on this topic, but these articles do not describe the standard 
as a whole.  As far as security of the standard is concerned, we have no research 
material available yet, and most probably we will be the first one to research the security 
issues in WirelessHART. The HCF has released the WirelessHART standard as a set of 
specifications. So we will be exploring and analyzing the standard from the ground up 
and looking for security loopholes as well as identifying areas for future research.  
For this purpose we will start up with the quantitative approach that is inductive in 
nature as it helps us answer questions such as how much security WirelessHART 
provides, to what extent and how often?  The use of this approach will really help us to 
identify shortcomings in the WirelessHART, and we can then perform threat analysis of 
WirelessHART.  
 
KTH/SICS/ABB | WirelessHART Security 13 
 
After analyzing WirelessHART security using the quantitative approach we will 
shift to a qualitative approach that is deductive in nature as it helps us answer questions 
such as why it is important to secure WirelessHART, how can we secure it, and what 
should we do to provide a comprehensive solution to secure WirelessHART 
communication at both wireless and wired realms.  
The security mechanisms in WirelessHART standard are spread throughout the 
specifications and there is no single specification that explains the security issues 
comprehensively. So we will study the whole standard and find the security mechanisms 
employed. Later on, we will critically analyze the security mechanisms and try to find 
some shortcoming (if any). The WirelessHART governing body claims that it is a secure 
standard but at the same time they state that they have employed security in only the 
wireless part of the standard not in the complete (wired and wireless) system. 
1.5. Scope 
This thesis fulfills the requirements of a Master’s Thesis Project at KTH Sweden. The thesis is 
carried out at the Swedish Institute of Computer Science (SICS) Stockholm in collaboration with 
Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) Sweden. This thesis deals with the secure communication in Wireless 
Mesh Networks in general and WirelessHART in specific. WirelessHART is the only available 
standard for Wireless Mesh Networks at the time of conducting this research. The following 
figure shows that our scope is limited to the technologies inside. 
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Figure 1: Scope is limited to the technologies inside 
The contact persons in SICS and ABB are:  
 Adriaan Slabbert   (SICS) 
adriaan@sics.se 
 Thiemo Voigt               (SICS) 
thiemo@sics.se 
 Krister Landernas   (ABB) 
krister.landernas@se.abb.com 
 Tomas Lennvall    (ABB) 
Tomas.Lennval@se.abb.com 
1.6. Thesis Constitution 
The tentative outlines for the thesis are: 
1. Introduction 
2. WirelessHART Security 
3. WirelessHART Security Analysis 
4. Key Management in Multihop Wireless Mesh Networks (WirelessHART)  
5. Security in Integrated WirelessHART and HART Protocols 
6. Design and Implementation of Security Manager 
7. Conclusion and Future Work  
Security 
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CHAPTER 2: WirelessHART Security  
 
 
This chapter will start with general overview of multi-hop wireless mesh networks; and 
explain the specific characteristics of mesh networks and the standardization of wireless mesh 
networks. The specific features of WirelessHART, as being mesh networking standard, and the 
employed security in the standard will be discussed later in the chapter. 
2.1. Multihop Wireless Mesh Networks  
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are gaining attention with the advancement of wireless 
technologies like smart antennas and Multi-Input Multi-Output systems. WMN is a new wireless 
network communication architecture that has the following unique features. 
 Every network device act as a router, so all nodes can communicate through multi-
hopping.  
 Almost all radio nodes are static. 
 Use novel radio technology like smart antenna and multiple channels 
 Also use connecting devices like gateway for communication between devices    
 The network is usually a mixture of wireless and wired devices 
 WMNs are self-configured and self-organized 
 
WMNs can be considered as one kind of ad hoc networks where nodes are normally static; 
but WMNs can also be regarded as wireless sensor networks in the sense that nodes usually 
contain one or more sensors. So the WMNs are a combination of ad hoc and sensor networks 
where sensor nodes act as router and hence support multi-hopping. Some of the applications of 
WMNs include: home and enterprise networks, network management services, reliable broadband 
services, industrial process control system, etc. WMNs can be developed and deployed using any 
of the physical interfaces but the usefulness is more in IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.15 (PAN), 
and/or IEEE 802.16 (WiMax).  
WMN is an active research area and people are working on different physical interfaces in 
order to find new applications and usages for the mesh networking. The standardization is 
important for commercial usage and interoperability between different vendors. New 
specifications for WMNs are under developed by different standardization task groups of the 
IEEE. IEEE 802.11s task group is working on the standardization of Wi-Fi with multi-hop and 
multi-channel capabilities, IEEE 802.15 task group 5 is working on standardization of personal 
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area network with mesh networking capabilities, and the IEEE 802.16 standard was refined with 
non line-of-sight (NLOS) and mesh networking capabilities in the IEEE 802.16a standard. 
HART Communication Foundation took the initiative of standardization of HART protocol 
with wireless mesh networking capabilities that meets the requirements of process industry. The 
project was started in early 2004 and the standard was approved in September 2007; the new 
standard is formally named WirelessHART. International Electro-technical Commission 
(IEC) has approved it as an open standard in September 2008.  
The other Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) standards such as Bluetooth 
and ZigBee have tried to enter into industrial automation but were unsuccessful because 
of some standard inherited limitations[20]. Other protocol such as WibRee and 
ISA100.11.a:2008 are trying to enter in the industrial applications as well.     
This thesis will cover only the WirelessHART standard, not the other mesh 
networking standards by IEEE 802 and ISA. WirelessHART uses the same physical 
interface as used by IEEE 802 PAN (IEEE 802.15), Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and ZigBee.     
2.2. WirelessHART 
WirelessHART is the first open standard for process automation industry specified by 
HART Communication Foundation (HCF) and approved by IEC. Before the standardization of 
WirelessHART, there was very slow progress in process automation industry regarding the use of 
advance wireless networking techniques because interoperability among different product by 
different vendors was almost impossible. Now with the advent of WirelessHART standard, the 
vendors have shown greater interest in the standard and developing different products bases on 
WirelessHART protocol. The users are also eager to use the new products; and the overall 
environment and trends in the process automation industry are changing. This change has brought 
the interest in the wireless network researches and organization to delve deeper in the standard 
and investigate the feasibility of implementing it for real environments.  
After reviewing the standard, we have found some unique features that are very 
promising to implement it in real world applications. These features are explained in the 
following sections. 
2.2.1. Network Topology 
WirelessHART uses wireless mesh networking technologies for communication between 
devices. In WMNs, every device acts like a router that in turn provides multiple network paths for 
communication. According to WirelessHART standard [2], for each wireless device there should 
be at least two  connected neighbors that can route traffic using graph routing. Mesh topology 
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provides more reliability, have low installation cost, wide coverage, and dynamic network 
connectivity. The use of mesh networking topology makes WirelessHART more reliable to use in 
sensitive applications like industrial process automation and control. The following figure shows 
the WirelessHART network. 
 
Figure 2: WirelessHART Network 
WirelessHART comprises of five core devices: 
– Field Device (FD): A wireless sensor device connected to the actual process.  
– Gateway: An Access Point that connects wireless network with the plant automation 
network. 
– Adapters: It is used to connect wired HART devices with WirelessHART network.  
– Network Manager: An application for configuring and scheduling for network. 
– Handheld:  Host application residing on the portable device; this device can be 
connected with any field device. It is normally used for device/network monitoring 
and/or writing Join key (see section 4.2.1).  
 
Other devices that are the part of complete WirelessHART standard are: 
– Security Manager (SM): The Network Manager uses the SM for key management, but 
the SM can also be used for secure communication in the wired part of the 
WirelessHART network. Chapter 6 will give the design and implementation of the SM 
for WirelessHART.    
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– Plant Automation Host (PAH): These are the applications that reside on some host(s) 
that use the output of the processes, sensed by the sensor attached to the field devices. 
– Router: In a mesh network, if a field device has no or less neighboring devices for 
routing messages then routers can be added in the network for path redundancy. Routers 
are not sensors like field devices and hence are not attached to the processes.  
– Access Point (AP): Normally APs are built into the gateway but they can exist as 
separate devices. APs connect a gateway to the wireless devices. AP is the entry point to 
the wireless network from the core network, and it is an entry point to the core network 
from the wireless network. 
2.2.2. Protocol Stack 
WirelessHART protocol stack is more or less the same OSI seven layers stack with some 
extensions for more security and reliability. Security Sub-Layer is add beneath Network Layer for 
enhanced security and MAC sub layer is added for reliable communication through channel 
hopping. Like HART protocol, WirelessHART is command oriented; this means that all 
WirelessHART messages are the combination of commands that flow through the network. 
Transport PDU is constituted [11] by combining transport byte, device status, and one and more 
commands at the Transport layer and sends to the Network layer for delivery. Network Layer 
provides routing and data security. Data link layer is responsible for wireless signaling, security, 
and reliability. Physical layer finally converts bits into wireless signals and sends them to 
neighbors at 2.4 GHz frequency (the same used by Bluetooth and ZigBee).  
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Figure 3: WirelessHART Protocol Stack 
2.2.3. Legacy support 
 
One of the features that makes WirelessHART a more ready-to-use standard is the 
provision for legacy HART devices. WirelessHART specifications list Adapters as one of the 
WirelessHART devices that are used for integrating/connecting the HART devices with 
WirelessHART network. Depending upon the design of Adapters, one or more HART devices 
can be connected with the WirelessHART network; but Adapters are not meant for connecting the 
whole Token passing based HART network with the mesh topology based WirelessHART 
network. The integration of HART and WirelessHART networks will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. 
2.2.4. Security and Reliability 
HCF claims WirelessHART to be a secure protocol. Security in WirelessHART is 
enforced at Network layer and Data-link layer. Data-link layer provides hop-to-hop security 
between two neighboring devices using Network key; and Network layer enforces end-to-end 
security between source and destination using session key(s) and/or join key. Section 2.3 will 
discuss WirelessHART Security in detail.  
WirelessHART is considered a reliable protocol. WirelessHART uses 2.4 GHz frequency 
band which is a free unlicensed portion of the spectrum; the adaptation of this frequency band 
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leads to the interference which is avoided by using Channel Hopping: shuffling frequency 
channels and using the one which has the least interference. Channel Hopping clearly enhances 
the reliability of WirelessHART network. Also, WirelessHART uses the concept of Blacklisting 
i.e. if some frequency band frequently suffers from interference then it can be blacklisted 
(banned) permanently by an administrator. Reliability is further enhanced by providing multiple 
paths from source to destination using mesh networking technology.    
2.2.5. Intelligent Devices 
WirelessHART is a self healing and self organizing wireless protocol, meaning that the 
devices are able to find neighbors and establish paths with the neighbors by getting channel 
hopping and synchronization information and measuring signal strength. This device intelligence 
is a source of long term network performance and expansion. 
 
The wireless nature of WirelessHART makes it easy and feasible to deploy, especially is 
manufacturing industry where use of cables drastically increases cost. Installation cost of 
WirelessHART is far less than in case of the legacy HART protocol. In spite of all these 
advances, WirelessHART is prone to attacks because of its wireless communication medium. The 
next section will discuss specified WirelessHART security in detail and the next chapter will 
critically analyze the provided security and try to find any shortcomings.  
2.3. WirelessHART Security 
Primarily, WirelessHART is based on the mesh networking technology but at the same 
time it also inherits the features of wireless sensor networks as all the field devices are equipped 
with one or more sensors. Sensors investigate the actual process. So, the security requirements for 
the WirelessHART network amalgamate the security requirements for both the mesh network and 
the wireless sensor network.  
WirelessHART is an IEC-approved standard for industrial process automation and 
control and is comparatively secure and reliable protocol for the process automation. The field 
devices collect data about processes and securely send it, as an input, to the other field devices. 
PAHs can also collect data from the field devices on a secure channel. The routing information, 
security keys, and the timing information are sent to the devices in a secure way. In short, all data 
in the WirelessHART network travel in the form of commands and the confidentiality, integrity, 
and the authenticity of the commands are ensured, while the data travels through the wireless part 
of the WirelessHART network but not in wired part.  
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The WirelessHART standard strongly recommends that the data communication in the 
wired part of the network should be conducted on a secure channel but does not enforce and 
specify any means to provide security and reliability in a wired network. We will discuss the 
ways to secure wired part of the WirelessHART network in upcoming chapters; here we will 
focus on wireless portion security and see how WirelessHART enforces secure communication 
between the devices.  
As we have seen before, the WirelessHART protocol stack is based on the OSI seven 
layers architecture, but only from network layer onwards, the data (WirelessHART Commands) is 
protected. The data from the transport to the application layer is clear with no cryptographic 
protection, but still it fulfills the requirements for the secure and reliable communication in the 
wireless network.  
The following figure shows OSI seven layer enabled WirelessHART protocol stack with 
the security (and reliability) features at different layers.  
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Figure 4: Security at different OSI based layers of WirelessHART 
Figure 4 shows that the network and data-link layer are collectively used to provide core 
security services: Confidentiality, Data Integrity, Source Integrity (Authenticity), and 
Availability. In the following section we will inspect these security services in details. 
2.3.1. Source-to-Destination end-to-end security   
The Network Layer is used to provide end-to-end security between the source and 
destination devices; it also provides routing and transport services. The Network Layer either gets 
the Transport PDU (TPDU) from Transport layer and sends it towards the destination by 
enforcing security and providing intermediate routing information, or gets Data-link PDU 
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(DLPDU) from the data-link layer and processes it accordingly. If the DLPDU is intended for the 
current device, it will send it to the transport layer for further processing, but if data is destined 
for another device it will send it back to the Data-link layer. Now, any data that travels from the 
network layer to the data-link layer is enciphered (except for the NPDU header) and only the 
destination device is able to decipher it. 
All data from the source field device to the destination field device always travel through 
the gateway because two field devices cannot create sessions (possible to create such sessions but 
prohibited in the standard) between them. Sessions are only created between the wireless devices1 
and gateway, and between wireless devices and the network manager. So, if a field device 
(source) wants to send data to another field device (destination), it will encrypt the data with the 
unique symmetric session key and send it to the destination via gateway; the gateway will decrypt 
the source device’s data and encrypt it again with the destination device’s session key and send it 
towards destination as gateway has session with all the field devices.  
Any wireless device that is a part of WirelessHART network has four session keys, one 
Join key, and the Network key. A Handheld device also needs a Handheld Key2. Normally, the 
network layer requires four session keys to create sessions between: 
i. Gateway and single wireless device1 (unicast) 
ii. Network Manager and single wireless device (unicast) 
iii. Gateway to all wireless devices (broadcast) 
iv. Network Manager to all wireless devices (broadcast) 
A peer-peer session (direct one-to-one) can also be created between the handheld device and the 
field device using the Handheld key (see sub-section 2.3.3).  
The management and distribution of keys will be discussed in next chapter. Here we will 
discuss the ways the network layer enforces end-to-end security using these keys. WirelessHART 
Network Layer PDU (NPDU) is shown is the following table; 
Header SCB Counter MIC NPDU Payload (Encrypted) 
Table 1: WirelessHART Network Layer PDU 
The Transport Layer PDU3 (TPDU) in the table above is an NPDU payload which is 
always encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a 128 bit key. The Message 
Integrity Code (MIC), Counter, and Security Control Byte (SCB) collectively form Security Sub-
                                                 
1 Wireless device can be: Field Device, Adapter, and Handheld. Routers are also wireless devices used to enhance 
reliability by routing traffic to the next hop (only), they cannot maintain Gateway sessions. 
2 Handheld key is use to communicate with a single device using a special high speed superframe [5]. 
3 TPDU is the actual HART/WirelessHART data consist of Transport Byte, Device status or Device extended device 
status, and aggregated commands. 
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layer for the WirelessHART protocol stack (See table 1). Other fields in NPDU are needed for 
routing of data; for details about these fields please consult Network Management Specification 
by HCF (HCF_SPEC-85). The three fields in the security sub-layer are used as follows: 
i. Security Control Byte (SCB): It is used for defining the type of the security employed. 
First four bits are reserved for future security enhancement and the next four bits define 
the security types. Till HART 7.1, only three types are identified. See the figure below for 
details. 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii. Counter: A four-byte nonce counter that is used to create nonce.  
iii. MIC: It is used for data integrity and source integrity (authentication) between source and 
destination. The MIC is calculated on the whole NPDU by setting the TTL, counter, and 
MIC to zero. Four byte-strings are needed to calculate the MIC, including: 
– NPDU header (a): from control byte to MIC 
– NPDU payload (m): the encrypted TPDU 
– The Nonce: It is 13-byte long and provides defense against reply attacks. The first 
byte is either all ones (for join response message only) or all zeros. The next 4 bytes 
makeup the nonce counter; and the remaining 8 bytes form the source address. For 
detail about constructing this counter please refer to page 51-53 of Network 
management Specification by HCF (HCF_SPEC_085). The counter field in the 
security sub-layer is populated with this nonce counter before sending the message. 
– AES key: A 128 bit key is needed for calculating MIC; this is the same key which is 
used for the encryption of NPDU payload.  
 
Network Layer in WirelessHART protocol stack provides three security services: 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authentication. AES in Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode is 
used to calculate MIC (to provide authentication and data integrity) and encrypting (to provide 
confidentiality) NPDU payload. Same session key is used for both encryption and MIC 
calculation.  
Security bits Security Type 
0 0 0 0 Session Keyed 
0 0 0 1 Join keyed 
0 0 1 0 Handheld Keyed 
Figure 5: Security Control Byte 
Reserved 
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CCM mode is the combination of counter mode and Cipher Block Chaining-Message 
Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) mode. The two methods are highlighted below: 
i. AES-CCM CBC-MAC mode:  
CBC-MAC mode is used to calculate MIC. CBC-MAC can be used for both 
plaintext and cipher text as in WirelessHART, and this mode needs exact number of 
blocks (padding can be used to equalize the last block). Only Encryption is used for 
calculating and verifying MIC. The four parameters (discussed above in point 3 under 
MIC) are used to calculate MIC. A formatting function is applied on Unencrypted NPUD 
header, encrypted NDPU payload, and on Nonce to produce the blocks B0, B1, B2 
…..Bi; for details about this formatting function and combination please refer to [6]. The 
following figure shows the working of CBC-MAC mode. 
  
B0 B1
AESAES
B2 Bi
AESAES MIC
IV
 
Figure 6: AES-CCM CBC-MAC mode for calculating MIC 
 
ii. AES-CCM in Counter mode 
Counter mode is used for the encryption/decryption of WirelessHART NPDU payload. 
Here too, the message blocks are created in the same fashion as above, but no padding is 
required and blocks can be manipulated in parallel. The counter mode is shown in the 
figure below.  
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Figure 7: AES-CCM Counter mode for enciphering NPDU payload 
 
Till now, we have seen that security sub-layer (under network layer) allows confidential 
and correct end-to-end communication between the WirelessHART devices, but WirelessHART 
also provides ways to secure the wireless signal that flows between the two neighboring wireless 
devices. 
2.3.2. Per-Hop Security 
The Data link-layer is used to provide per-hop security between the two neighboring 
wireless devices using Network key. The Network key is known to all the authenticated devices 
in the WirelessHART network. Consider the Data Link-layer PDU (DLPDU) below. 
0x41 
Address 
Specifier 
SN 
Network 
ID 
Destination 
Address 
Source 
Address 
DLPDU 
Specifier 
DLPDU 
Payload 
MIC CRC 
Figure 8: DLPDU 
The MIC is calculated on the entire PDU (from field 0x41 to DPPDU Payload) using 
AES-CCM mode (For details see section 2.3.1). The four parameters for the AES CCM mode are: 
– m: It is the encrypted message; but as the DLPDU is not encrypted so the length of this 
byte-string is zero. 
– a: DLPDU from 0x41 to DLPDU payload (shown as shaded portion in the figure 
above). 
– N:  It is a 13 bytes byte-string that is formed by concatenating the Absolute Slot 
Number (ASN)4 and source address. Following table shows its construction.  
 
13 Byte-strings  Value Nonce (N) 
                                                 
4 ASN is the total slots that occurred since network is formed and it is always incremented and must never be reset. 
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First 5 bytes 5-byte ASN N[0] - N[4] (MSB to LSB) 
Next 8 bytes 
EUI-64 Source Address N[5] - N[12]5 
2-bytes Nickname + zeros N[11]-N[12] is Nickname, N[5]-N[10] are zeros 
Table 2: Nonce for DLPDU MIC 
– K: 128 bit Network Key 
 
DLPDU ensures source integrity (authentication) of the message that flows between the 
two neighboring devices. The receiving device gets the DLPDU and verifies the MIC; if the 
calculated MIC is not equal to the MIC in the DLPDU, the packet is discarded. 
DLPDU also offers data integrity (not as standard security service against active attacks) 
using Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). CRC is not a cryptographic way to enforce integrity; 
rather it is just a way to check communication errors as no secret key is used to calculate the 
CRC. WirelessHART standard uses the 16-bits ITU-T polynomial [4] to calculate CRC. 
 
During the joining process, the device has only the Join key but no Network key. The join 
request is secured with the Join key (shared between the wireless device and the network 
manager) at network layer level. To be able to communicate with the neighboring devices the 
WirelessHART device must have a Network key, but as the joining device is not a part of 
network it needs some known key in order to calculate the MIC.  WirelessHART standard 
specifies a well-known key (777 772E 6861 7274 636F 6D6D 2E6F 7267) for per-hop 
communication during the join process (and also for advertising join packets). The bit 3 in the 
DLPDU Specifier (see figure 8 above) is used to species the key type being used to authenticate 
the DLPDU. If this bit 3 is set (i.e. 1), the Network key is used to used to authenticate the 
DLPDU; otherwise, the well-known key will be used.  
2.3.3. Peer-Peer Security 
All traffic in the WirelessHART network flows through the gateway, but handheld 
devices can create a direct one-to-one wireless connection6 with the field device using the 
Handheld key. In order to establish this connection with the field device, the handheld device first 
has to join the WirelessHART network using its join key. When the handheld device is a part of 
                                                 
5 N[5] to N[7] will contain 0x00, 0x1b, and 0x1E respectively. Extended device type code is copied in N[8]-N[9]; and 
Device ID is copied in N[10]-N[12]. 
6 Handheld can also have direct wired connection with the field device using device’s maintenance port but the 
communication on this connection does not use TDMS based WirelessHART protocol. This type of connection is 
normally used to write the Join key in wireless devices. 
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the WirelessHART network, it can get the Handheld key (for the specific device) from the 
Network Manager. The received handheld key is used to create a one-to-one direct session with 
the field device. This session is normally used for device maintenance. 
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Chapter 3: WirelessHART Security Analysis 
 
 
Although WirelessHART standard provides recommended (by NIST USA) ways to secure 
the communication between the wireless devices, the security of an industrial process automation 
system depends on the complete protection of wireless medium as well as the wired medium. The 
lack of security at the wired portion of the complete WirelessHART network leads to the new 
challenges and threats. In this chapter we will evaluate the security and reliability of the complete 
WirelessHART network by doing threat analysis. Both wireless network and the wired network 
threats will be discussed. Also, the threats and challenges we can face at the point of integration 
of the wireless and the wired networks will be discussed. 
3.1. Wireless Threats 
A threat is an indication of a potential undesirable event [13]. The mandatory properties of 
threats include: Asset under attack, Actor what/who breaches the security, and Outcome of 
security breach. Optionally, Motive (intentional/unintentional) can be one of the properties of 
threat.  In case of WirelessHART, the asset is either the data stored in one of the devices or the 
information which flows through the network. Outcome of the security breach is leak or 
modification of information, or disruption of smooth network traffic.      
Now we will enlist the possible threats against WirelessHART and try to find which threats 
are addressed by WirelessHART and which threats need to be addressed. The threats which are 
not addressed in WirelessHART lead to the potential vulnerabilities in the standard. The potential 
threats and their effect on WirelessHART network are discussed below: 
3.1.1. Interference 
It is an unintentional disruption of radio signal; a signal with same frequency and 
modulation technique can override the actual signal at the receiver. WirelessHART operates at 
2450 (2400-2483.5) MHz frequency band spectrum and has 16 channels and each channel’s 
bandwidth is 5 MHz. This spectrum is shared with IEEE 802.11b/g commonly called Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth, and ZigBee. However, the use of Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) [7] 
(frequency diversity), time diversity, and path diversity almost eliminates the chances of 
interference but still the strict and sensitive nature of a process automation system requires fail 
proof7 reliability of the wireless medium. Failing to provide 100% reliability may lead to 
                                                 
7 The chances of failure are 0%. 
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catastrophic outcomes. The growth of Wi-Fi, WibRee, ZigBee, Bluetooth etc. devices can make 
WirelessHART 2.4 GHz frequency band vulnerable to interference in future.  
3.1.2. Jamming 
It is normally considered an intentional interruption of radio signal when purposely 
introducing noise or signal with same frequency and modulation technique as used in the target 
network. WirelessHART is more vulnerable to jamming attacks than interference; the attacker 
can deliberately introduce radio signals using commonly used Bluetooth devices like cell phone 
and laptops. In the automation industry, unintentional jamming can also occur as the operating 
machines can produce sufficient noise that can jam some of the channels.  
WirelessHART introduces the concept of channel Blacklisting. If some frequency channel is 
jammed or is a continuous source of interference, then it can be omitted and channel hopping is 
restricted to other available channels. In WirelessHART channel Blacklisting is network-wide 
and is done manually by a network administrator. Blacklisting enhances the reliability of the 
WirelessHART network but at the same time it limits the number of channels the device can use 
to send/receive traffic.  
In spite of FHSS and 15 available channels, the active attacker can jam the WirelessHART 
network. The switching of channels in the FHSS is based on pseudorandom sequence. Now if, 
a) An attacker has knowledge of pseudorandom sequence which may help in calculating 
actual channel. 
(ActualChannel = (ChannelOffset + ASN) % NumChannels)  [9] 
b) And has sufficient number of 2.4 GHz (Bluetooth or ZigBee) based devices in 
WirelessHART range (normally cheap) 
c) The manufacturing plant has legally deployed Wi-Fi networks in and around 
WirelessHART network 
d) The Manufacturing Plant produces sufficient amount of noise signals (which is very 
common there) 
e) Some of the channels are already blacklisted 
then the active attacker can  jam the WirelessHART network. This jamming of the whole or a part 
of WirelessHART network can block or even damage the manufacturing machinery. 
3.1.3. Sybil Attack 
 In the Sybil attack [26], an antagonist can hold multiple identities by introducing an adverse 
entity (a node or piece of software) into a network. The lack of trusted central authority in the 
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traditional wireless ad hoc and sensor networks make it possible for the adversary to own 
multiple identities. 
The Network Manager in the WirelessHART network binds an entity with a unique identity. 
The Network Manager assigns a unique Nickname to all the connected devices. Also, every 
device has a unique ID (combination of Device Type and Device ID) which is unique for the 
device globally. The WirelessHART Gateway maintains the list of the Unique IDs and the 
Network Manager maintains the list of the Nicknames; the wireless devices uses these Unique 
IDs and Nicknames (along with the session keys) to maintain sessions with the Gateway and 
Network Manager respectively. This makes the success of Sybil attack almost impossible in the 
WirelessHART network. 
3.1.4. Tampering 
 The compromise of shared Network key can lead to the tempering of DLPDU. As 
DLPDU is unencrypted, the attacker can route the packet to its desired direction by inspecting 
and changing the destination address. This attack is more effective if the attacker changes the 
destination address to the source address and sends the packet back to its source. In short, having 
knowledge of Network key and unencrypted DLPDU, an adversary can seriously damage the 
normal operations of the WirelessHART network by tampering with the DLPDU and calculating 
the MIC again to make it authentic. 
3.1.5. Collusion 
Wireless collusion can occur when two or more devices try to access the same frequency 
channel at exactly the same time; collusion can be intentional or unintentional. The combination 
of time diversity and frequency diversity is used to minimize the collusion and CRC-16 is used to 
detect the collusion in the WirelessHART network. To minimize the collusion, WirelessHART 
protocol provides scheduled data transmission based on time slotting; Time Division Multiple 
Access (TDMA) and channel hopping is used to control access to the network. The CRC is used 
to detect the collusion based on ITU-T polynomial (aka CRC-16)[4]. 
The CRC-16 might not be able to detect the insertion attack (see security consideration 
in[4]. This attack can be avoided by better implementation and active coordination between the 
Physical and Data-link layer especially when the physical layer connection state changes. 
3.1.6. Exhaustion 
Any device that supports the WirelessHART protocol stack and has knowledge of 
unsecure WirelessHART network parameters (network ID etc. ) can send messages to 
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WirelessHART devices using the well-known network key(see section 2.3.2). The fake device can 
use the well-known key for calculating the MIC over the DLPDU; and can use the Join key (fake) 
to encrypt and authenticate the NPDU. Although this message will be discarded when received by 
the Network Manager it consumes network resources along the route from the field device to the 
Network Manager. If a series of such join attempts are initiated by an active attacker then it can 
give rise to a serious DOS effect/risk. 
3.1.7. Spoofing 
 Field devices use well-known network key for not only joining the network but also for 
the advertisements8. The adversary can spoof the new joining device by sending fake 
advertisements and on receipt of the join request it can simply discard it. If the spoofing device is 
more close to the joining device then the new device will not be able to join the network. If the 
fake device has access to the valid Network key then the spoofing attack will be more effective 
and can result in a serious blockage of network traffic. 
3.1.8. DOS 
Denial-of-Service (DOS) is the simple common attack but it is still very effective to interrupt 
the normal operation of the WirelessHART network. DOS attack against the normal operation of 
the WirelessHART network can be launched by:  
 Flooding the network with the join requests. 
 Sending the fake Advertisements to the neighbors. 
 Replacing the DLPDU and re-computing the CRC. If DLPDU and corresponding CRC 
are replaced then the WirelessHART has to verify the message integrity by calculating 
the MIC. WirelessHART protocol uses AES in CCM for calculating MIC; this is an 
expensive task which requires strict timing (TsTxAckDelay =1ms [8]) requirements to 
verify the MIC. The unverified packet will be discarded, which results in the 
retransmission of the packet and consumption of network resources. 
 A DOS attack can also be launched by jamming the radio signal (see jamming above). 
3.1.9. Traffic Analysis 
The NPDU header and DLPDU are un-encrypted and the adversary can easily analyze 
the WirelessHART traffic. The NPDU header fields e.g. source/Destination addresses, Security 
Control byte, ANS snippet, and Nonce counter are all sent in clear; also, the DLPDU fields e.g. 
                                                 
8 WirelessHART devices have Advertisement slot that are reserved for the joining devices who want to join the 
network. 
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Address Specifier, Addresses, and DLPDU Specifier are sent in clear. These fields provide 
enough information to the rival to allow analysis of the network: finding new devices (using join 
requests), work peak hours, device usage (that can help to make other attacks more effective) etc.       
3.1.10. Wormhole 
It is one of the most famous attacks in ad hoc networking. WMNs like WirelessHART 
are also prone to these attacks. In a wormhole attack, the adversary creates a tunnel between two 
legitimate devices by connecting them through the stronger wireless link or wired link. The 
potential WirelessHART devices that the attacker can use to launch wormhole attack are HART 
devices connected to WirelessHART network through Adapters; the adversary can create a tunnel 
by connecting two field devices by using their maintenance port (WirelessHART protects this by 
restricting network access in this mode). A tunnel can also be created by the wireless connection 
if the Network key  (shared between all the devices)  and session keys are compromised. 
WirelessHART is subjected to wormhole attack if it is using Graph Routing (that 
supports redundant paths), but if Source Routing is used then the device must use device-by-
device route from source to destination. Source Routing provides defense against wormhole 
attacks but is not reliable, since if any of the intermediate links fail the packet will be lost. 
WirelessHART protocol does not provide direct defense mechanisms to fight against 
wormhole attack. One good solution to this shortcoming is packet leaching [10]. 
3.1.11. Selective Forwarding Attack 
The success of Sybil attack can give rise to selective routing attack. Here the 
compromised node will not forward all packets and selectively drops packets. The worst form is 
when the node does not forward any packet and creates a black hole, but normally the node 
selectively discards packets so that it is considered as legitimate and could not be detected by the 
recovering mechanisms. The Selective Forward attack is more effective if it is backed by proper 
traffic analysis.  
3.1.12. De-synchronization 
WirelessHART network has strict timing requirements, and Timer is one of the primary 
modules in the WirelessHART. The timer module has to meet the timing requirements and keep 
the time slots (10ms) in synchronization. The MAC sub-layer is responsible for time slotting. 
Each time a node receives an ACK from its time source, it adjusts its clock. The timing source for 
a node can be a sender [8]; and if the sender is compromised it can disrupt the timing between 
two nodes and the participating nodes are compelled to waste their resources in synchronization. 
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The following table summarizes these threats with respect to protocol layers: 
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OSI Layer 
Security 
Threat 
General/WirelessHART Defense Mechanism 
Physical 
Interference Channel hopping and Blacklisting. 
Jamming Channel hopping and Blacklisting. 
Sybil Physical Protection of WirelessHART devices. 
Tampering Protection and Changing of Network key.  
Data-Link 
Collusion CRC and Time diversity 
Exhaustion Protection of Network ID and other information that is required to joining device. 
Spoofing Use different path for re-sending the message. 
Sybil Regularly changing of Network key. 
De-Synchronization Using different neighbors for time synchronization. 
Traffic Analysis 
Sending of dummy packet in quite hours; and regular monitoring WirelessHART network 
using Handhelds etc.  
Eavesdropping Network Key protects DLPDU from Eavesdropper. 
Network 
Wormhole 
Physical monitoring of Field devices and regular monitoring of network using Source Routing. 
Monitoring system may use Packet Leash techniques[10]. 
Selective 
forwarding attack 
Regular network monitoring using Source Routing. 
DOS 
Protection of network specific data like Network ID etc. Physical protection and inspection of 
network. 
Sybil Resetting of devices and changing of session keys. 
Traffic Analysis 
Sending of dummy packet in quite hours; and regular monitoring WirelessHART network 
using Handhelds etc. 
Eavesdropping Session keys protect NPDU from Eavesdroppers. 
Table 3: Attacks on Wireless portion of WirelessHART    
Although WirelessHART Standard provides strong security defenses to protect wireless 
devices, the poor administration or weak implementation of the WirelessHART protocols can put 
it under attack. Also, the physical protection of the assets in a WirelessHART network is very 
important.  
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3.2. Wired/Core network Threats 
The wireless medium in WirelessHART protocol in considered secure and reliable and 
security is not optional and all messages flowing in the wireless portion must adhere to these 
security requirements. However, the security in the wired medium is neither specified nor 
enforced. Although the WirelessHART standard specifies that connection between the wired or 
core network device should be secure, the security is optional in wired portion and the 
WirelessHART protocol still works without securing the wired medium. This lack of security in 
the wired portion makes it more vulnerable to attacks. Some of the attacks are discussed below. 
3.2.1. Weak or Partial security solutions 
The security in the core/wired portion of the WirelessHART standard is optional i.e. the 
protocol will work without secure links between the wired devices. Even if the security in wired 
network is enforced, the weak design will put the whole WirelessHART system at risk. Unlike 
wireless devices, wired devices are not resource constrained and strong security solutions (using 
asymmetric cryptography) should be provided to protect the wired network. Also the security in 
the wired network should be enforced among all the devices, not just between Gateway and 
Network Manager or between Network Manager and Security Manager. The partial security will 
certainly put the whole system under attack.  
3.2.2. Spoofing and Impersonation 
  This attack is very easy to perform in the absence of security in the core wired network. 
Even if the wired or core network is secured, the absence of uniformity in the security protocols 
in wireless and wired medium will make the whole system less defensive against attacks.  
The interface between the Gateway and the Network Manager is not specified in the 
WirelessHART standard. The poor design of this interface can make the whole WirelessHART 
network vulnerable to attacks. The ultimate point of attack for a smart attacker is the Gateway. 
The Gateway separates the wireless and wired network, and all WirelessHART network traffic 
passes through the Gateway. 
The Gateway maintains sessions with the wireless devices based on session keys; and 
wireless devices can access the Gateway through Access Points (APs). Now if the fake gateway 
(through access points) is able to spoof the nearby wireless devices that “I am the Gateway” then 
all the traffic from wireless devices will be directed to this gateway. This fake gateway can 
implement its own fake network manager (if the link between the Gateway and Network Manager 
is strongly protected), which leads to further attacks against the whole system.  
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The above attack is possible because one of the shortcomings in the WirelessHART is the 
lacking of two-way authentication, i.e. Network Manager checks the authenticity of the wireless 
devices (based on join key), but the wireless devices cannot check the authenticity of the Network 
Manager. The fake Network Manager can spoof the devices.  
          The fake gateway and the network manager can collectively spoof the other 
legitimate devices and gain control of the WirelessHART network. The spoofing results in 
impersonation or masquerading, i.e. the wireless devices will assume that they are 
communicating with the legitimate gateway but the gateway is masqueraded. 
3.2.3. DOS 
In the WirelessHART network, the wired/core9 portion is more prone to DOS than the 
wireless part. The wireless part has multiple links, multiple channels, and multiple time slots. On 
the other hand wired/core network devices normally have just one link. If the link between the 
core network devices is wireless like Wi-Fi then this is even more prone to DOS attacks, e.g. the 
failure of Wi-Fi link between the Gateway and the Network Manager will stop the functioning of 
the whole system.  
The reliability of the core portion is a serious concern while designing WirelessHART 
network. The delivery of the message can be verified by acknowledgement (ACK), but the path 
redundancy is not available in the core network portion. DOS attacks can easily be performed by 
flooding or jamming the Wi-Fi link between the core network devices.  
Main threats and their defense mechanisms, in the core/wired part of the WirelessHART network, 
are shown in the table below: 
  
                                                 
9 The link between the wired/core network devices can be wired or wireless. So by wired network we mean the core 
network from Gateway onward (Network Manager, PAH, Security Manager, and other specific application like Assets 
Manager) . 
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 Table 4: Attacks on Core/Wired portion of WirelessHART    
As the security in the core network is undefined we cannot precisely enlist threats, but it 
can be concluded that, in the absence of security in the core wired network, wireless network 
cannot function in a secure way. In order to provide secure and reliable communication in the 
wired network we will design a Security Manager. The last chapter shows the design and 
implementation of Security Manager that will enforce security in the core network along with 
meeting the requirements of the wireless network.   
3.3. Main Shortcoming in WirelessHART Security 
Some of the clear-cut shortcomings in WirelessHART standard are:  
1. Security of the connection between the Gateway and the Network Manager is optional, 
i.e. WirelessHART standard does not enforce or specify security mechanisms for the 
protection of the link between the Gateway and Network Manager; but it highly 
recommends that this connection should be secured. Security at network layer by 
protecting the NPDU is enforced at this link. 
2. WirelessHART does not enforce and specify security mechanisms to protect the link 
between the Security Manager and Network Manager, neither the link nor the data; but 
recommends that this link should be secured. 
Security 
Threat 
Defense Mechanism 
Spoofing Implementation of security in core network and excellent architecture of gateway. 
Masquerading Use of PKI in the core network will eliminate this issue if carefully implemented. 
DOS 
Eliminating illegal access to the legal network, proper monitoring and administration of 
network. (There is no definite solution against DOS attacks) 
Interference/ 
Jamming 
Better to use Wired medium between Network Manager and Gateway (but wireless link can be 
provided for redundancy and hence reliability). The redundant device can minimize this 
problem. 
Eavesdropping Physical protection of wires (OR Wi-Fi using WPA/RSN).  
Social Engineering Protection of device and network secrets such as passwords through education and reminders. 
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3. Also no security mechanisms are enforced to protect the connection between the Gateway 
and the host application. 
4. The integration between the WirelessHART network (secure) to the HART network 
(unsecure) is not specified. 
5. No public key cryptography. 
6. No path redundancy in the core/wired network 
7. One of the notable shortcomings in the WirelessHART standard is the lacking of key 
management. Although it specifies that Network Manager will get security keys from the 
Security Manage and distribute them accordingly but it does not specify the ways to 
generate, renew revoke, store, and vet keys. 
8. The design and functions of the Security Manager are not comprehensive in the 
WirelessHART standard. It simply specifies that Security Manager is used to generate 
key for WirelessHART. 
9. WirelessHART standard provides Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authentication security 
services for the wireless part but there are no security mechanisms in the standard to 
provide Authorization (Access Control), Accounting, and Non-repudiation security 
services for the WirelessHART network.  
10. The security mechanisms to protect the WirelessHART network are not specified in the 
form of a comprehensive document: these mechanisms are spread in all the 
WirelessHART specifications. It is very hard for the designers and developers to 
implement the security services without exploring the entire WirelessHART 
specifications. 
11. Last, but not least, WirelessHART standard does not specify the ways to securely 
integrate the HART and WirelessHART network. However, it provides the ways to add 
HART devices to the WirelessHART network using Adapters.      
3.4. Overcoming Security Shortcomings 
In section 2.3, we have seen that WirelessHART standard enforces security at different 
levels by using strong cryptographic techniques like AES. Due to the sensitive requirements of 
the industrial process automation and control systems, WirelessHART standard has to enforce 
security with fail proof reliability from the field devices to the host applications. Unfortunately 
the WirelessHART standard only provides the mechanisms for the security and the reliability of 
wireless part and does not specify the ways for secure and reliable communication among the 
wired or core network devices, not even between the main WirelessHART devices like Gateway 
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to Network Manager and Network Manager to Security Manager. The WirelessHART standard 
only recommends that the communication in the wired network should be secured, but the level 
of security is neither specified not enforced.  
In this chapter we have analyzed WirelessHART security and identified the 
shortcomings. In coming chapters we will provide the ways to overcome these shortcomings. The 
next Chapter will elaborate the key management in the standard and highlight the limitations of 
the WirelessHART regarding key management. Chapter 5 will provide ways to securely integrate 
HART and WirelessHART networks. The Last chapter will provide solutions to the rest of the 
shortcoming by designing and developing the Security Manager for the WirelessHART. 
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CHAPTER 4: Key Management in WirelessHART 
 
Like other wireless networks, key management in Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) is a 
difficult but very important aspect of the network security. Due to the unavailability of a central 
trust authority, the public key cryptography is difficult to apply in the WMNs. Unlike typical 
mesh networks, the WirelessHART network uses Network Manager as a central authority for the 
key distribution and other network management functions. Despite having a central authority and 
relatively high network capabilities, the WirelessHART standard has not specified the use of 
public key cryptography. The justifications for not using PKI are not clear yet10, but the 
unavailability of PKI has limited the WirelessHART security (only wireless part is secured) and 
some of the security services such as Non-repudiation cannot be provided by session key 
solutions. 
A complete WirelessHART network comprises wireless and wired devices; the 
comprehensive key management schemes are not specified for either of the network portions. 
Although the WirelessHART standard specifies the need for a Security Manager, its design and 
proper functionalities are not identified.  
In this chapter we will highlight the need for the key and explain what keys are used in 
WirelessHART network and how these keys can be managed. The chapter will end up by 
specifying the limitations of the WirelessHART regarding key management; these limitations will 
be addressed in chapter 6. 
4.1. Why Key Management 
The key management system is a main pillar in any network security system.  Automatic 
key management system is very important for the success of network security because: 
 Without the key management system, real time deployment of a network is not 
successful as the manual administration is infrequent and error prone. 
 If key selection is administrator dependent, he/she may choose a weak key (which 
normally happens). 
 Usually people use the same key (or some set of keys) on different systems; so the 
compromise of the key at one place will put the other systems in danger.  
In the past, the lack of automatic key management was the main cause of failure of some 
of the network security solutions. On good example of this is Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). 
                                                 
10 WirelessHART counterpart ISA100.11.a:2008 uses asymmetric cryptography. 
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The WEP was designed to secure the IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) but 
because of the manual key distribution and weak algorithms it is now breakable within minutes.  
 
WirelessHART, as an international standard for the process automation and control, 
enables secure and reliable communication in the wireless medium. Key management 
mechanisms for the wireless part of the WirelessHART network are specified but are vague and 
incomplete. In the coming sections we will see which keys are used in the WirelessHART 
network but the following section shows the key management mechanisms provided by the 
WirelessHART standard.  
4.2. Keys in WirelessHART 
 
The WirelessHART standard specifies11 the number of the keys needed and their usage 
but does not specify the ways to generate, store, revoke, renew, and distribute them. It is specified 
that the Network Manager is responsible for the distribution of keys, and the Security Manager is 
needed for the generation, storage, and vetting of keys; but the design and specific functionalities 
of the Security Manager are not identified. Furthermore, the interface between the Security 
Manager and Network Manager is not specified. Although the requirements for the distribution to 
keys to the wireless devices are specified but the precise steps needed to distribute these keys are 
unidentified.  
The keys needed by the WirelessHART (wireless part) devices are: 
 Join Key 
 Session Keys 
 Handheld Key 
 Network Key 
 Well-known Key 
The Network Manager is responsible for sending these keys to the devices via Gateway; 
and the Security Manager is responsible for the management of these keys. All WirelessHART 
keys are 128 bit long and are unsigned.  
4.2.1. Join Key 
The Join key is the first key that all wireless devices must contain in order to join the 
WirelessHART network. The Join key acts as a device password to the WirelessHART network. 
                                                 
11 The specifications for the keys need and their usage are somewhat vague in the standard and one can only identifies 
all the keys if he/she thoroughly going through all the new HART 7 documentations.   
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The Handheld device is normally used to enter the Join key in the Field devices using the 
device’s maintenance port. While adding (or later changing) the Join key in the device using 
maintenance port, the device must not be connected to the WirelessHART network. Like all other 
WirelessHART keys, the Join key is write-only and no device should be able to read it. 
The Join key is used to secure the joining session; the NPDU of the join message is 
protected using the Join key. The Join key only provides end-to-end security between the joining 
device and the Network Manager. The Network Manager verifies the authenticity of the new 
device using the Join key, and on successful verification, the Network Manager writes the 
Network key and session keys into the device.  
The Command 768 (Write Join Key) [12] is used to write the Join key in the device. 
Initially (when device is not the part of the WirelessHART network), the maintenance port is used 
to write the Join key, but later, the Network Manager can also change the Join key using 
command 768.   
4.2.2. Session Keys 
Session keys are allocated to the wireless devices on Power-up, Restart, or after 
successful join (as new device) operation. Every device has unique session keys. Four session 
keys are needed to establish a: 
i. Unicast session between the Gateway and the wireless device 
ii. Unicast session between the Network Manager and wireless device 
iii. Broadcast session from the Gateway to all the wireless devices 
iv. Broadcast session form the Network Manager to all the wireless devices. 
When a device makes an attempt to join the network its Join key is verified, and on 
success the Network key and Session keys are sent to the device on a secure channel (using the 
Join key). During the joining process [14], when the device status is “Embraced-Quarantined”, 
the device contains only the Network key and Network Manager-to-device session key. In this 
mode the device can only communicate with the Network Manager. Upon getting the Gateway 
session it enters into “Operational” stage and is able to communicate with all other devices.  
Session keys are used to provide end-to-end security between the devices. The NPDU 
payload is encrypted using the session key; and the same session key is used to calculate the MIC 
on the NPDU. Direct sessions are provided between the Network Manager/Gateway and Field 
device/Adapter; but the two field devices cannot (securely) communicate directly. All wireless 
devices have a secure unicast session with the Gateway. When a Field device needs to 
communicate with another Field device, it sends a message to the Gateway using the unicast 
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Gateway session key; the Gateway will transfer it to the destination device (by using the unicast 
Gateway session key of the destination device). 
 The Command 963 (Write Session) is used to write the sessions, containing Session 
keys, in the devices; only Network Manager can initiate this command. Sessions can be deleted 
by the Network Manager using the Command 964 (Delete Session).   
4.2.3. Network Key 
The WirelessHART not only provides end-to-end security between the source and 
destination but also provide per-hop security between the two neighboring devices. The data from 
the source to the destination passes through many hops, as all devices in the WirelessHART 
network act as router. The air interface between the two devices is protected using the Network 
key.  
The Network key is shared between all the devices in the WirelessHART network, i.e. 
there is only one Network key in the whole network.  The Network key is used to protect the 
Data-link layer PDU (see section 2.3.2). A device gets the Network key after successfully joining 
the network. The Command 961(Write Network Key) is used to write the Network key in the 
device; and only the Network Manager can initiate this command. The Network key can be 
changed by re-sending the Command 961 using the broadcast session (from Network Manager to 
the devices).   
4.2.4. Handheld Key 
The WirelessHART standard specifies the use of Handheld devices for the 
device/network monitoring and installation. For device maintenance, the Handheld device can be 
connected to the field device by using the device’s maintenance port or FSK modem; in this mode 
the Handheld device cannot access the WirelessHART network. Like all other wireless devices, 
the Handheld device can be connected to the WirelessHART network using the Join key. In this 
mode the Handheld device is used for network monitoring etc.  
The Handheld devices can also be connected to a specific field device using the wireless 
link. This represents direct peer-to-peer connection between the Handheld device and Field 
device (without the involvement of Gateway). In this type of connection, the Handheld device 
needs a special superframe and a Handheld key. The Handheld device gets a Handheld key from 
the Network Manager by establishing a secure connection with the Network Manager using the 
Join key. The Handheld key is used to secure the NPDU. Use of Handheld keys for protecting the 
NPDU is identified by the Security Control byte having value “00000010” (see fig. 5). 
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A special superframe (Handheld Superframe) is used between the Handheld devices and 
the wireless devices for the device maintenance. Applications (running on handheld device) can 
check the availability of the Handheld Superframe using the Command 806 (Read Handheld 
Superframe) [12], and can enable it using the Command 807 (Request Handheld Superframe 
Mode) [12]. Finally, the Handheld device can establish a peer-to-peer session with the wireless 
device by requesting the handheld session using the command 823 (Request Session)[12]; on 
success, Network Manager will return the peer device Nickname12, Nonce Counter, and Handheld 
key. 
4.2.5. Well-known Key 
According to the WirelessHART specifications, the NPDU and DLPDU must be 
protected using the 128 bit AES key. But during the joining process, a device contains the Join 
key to protect the NPDU and does not contain the Network key to protect the DLPDU. For the 
protection of the DLPDU during the joining process and for Advertisements, a Well-Known 
Network key (777 772E 6861 7274 636F 6D6D 2E6F 7267) is used. The third bit in the DLPDU 
Specifier (see figure 8 above) is used to specify the key type being used to authenticate the 
DLPDU.  
4.3. Key Management in WirelessHART 
The Key Management mechanisms play very important role in the success of any 
network standard where security is considered as an integral part of the system. The 
WirelessHART Standard not only specifies the keys needed to protect the wireless channel but 
also elaborates the way the keys should be managed, but the key management is not 
comprehensive in the standard. By the key management we mean: 
 Key Generation 
 Key Storage 
 Key Distribution 
 Key Renewal 
 Key Revoking 
 Key Vetting 
The WirelessHART network does not use asymmetric cryptography, so all keys are 
symmetric keys. WirelessHART uses centralized approach for the key establishment: the 
Network Manager is responsible for the distribution of keys and it acts as a Key Distribution 
                                                 
12 Nickname is 2-bytes device identification maintained by the Network Manager. The Well-known Nickname of the 
Network Manager is 0xF980 and of Gateway is 0xF981. 
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Center [16]. The Network Manager is not responsible for the management of keys; rather the 
WirelessHART standard uses the Security Manager for the key management. The design and 
functionalities of the Security Manager are not specified in the standard.  
As the WirelessHART standard does not specify the ways to secure the core/wired 
channels and the key management schemes for the wired network are considered as out of scope. 
The WirelessHART solutions for the key management and its limitations are discussed below:    
4.3.1. Key Generation 
The WirelessHART does not specify any specific requirements for the key generation. It 
just specifies that Security Manager is responsible for the key generation; however, the keys 
needed to secure the wireless channels are specified in the standard. Chapter 6 will provide 
solution to this shortcoming. 
4.3.2. Key Storage 
Like key generation, the WirelessHART does not provide ways for the key storage. This 
is an important issue because the security of the entire WirelessHART network depends on keys; 
and the security of keys depends on secure storage. Chapter 6 will propose means for secure 
storage of keys.  
4.3.3. Key Distribution 
The WirelessHART standard provides the means for the key distribution but not 
comprehensively. The Network manager is responsible for the distribution of keys to the devices. 
The means for distributing the keys to the devices are identified, but how the Network Manager 
can request keys from Security Manager is unidentified. Also, how the Join key is initially 
provisioned in device and provided to Network Manager is identified (but later the Join key can 
be changed automatically). According to the WirelessHART standard, only the Network Manager 
should be able to provide the keys to the wireless network. The WirelessHART commands used 
to distribute the keys are shown in the following table. 
 
WirelessHART Keys Commands 
Session Keys Command 963 (Write Session) 
Network Key Command 961 (Write Network Key) 
Handheld Key command 823 (Request Session) 
Join key Command 768 (Write Join Key) 
Table 5: Key Distribution Commands in WirelessHART 
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4.3.4. Key Renewal 
Key renewal or key changing is another important aspect of the key management system. 
If there are no time and resource constraints, all keys are breakable using the Brute-Force attack. 
The Key renewal mechanism provides the defense against this attack. For a successful security 
solution, the key renewal should be frequent and automatic. The WirelessHART provides 
mechanisms to renew all the specified keys. The commands used to change keys are shown in 
table 4 above (same are used for initial distribution); these commands will override the existing 
keys. 
The Network Key is changed by using the secure broadcast session (from the Network 
Manager to all the devices); Figure 31 in “Network Management Specification, HCF_SPEC-085, 
Revision 1.1” shown as example of changing the Network Key. Other keys are renewed using 
unicast session between the Network Manager and the devices. The limitation in the key renewal 
is: the Join key is used to change the session keys; and the unicast session key (Network Manager 
to device) is used to change the Join key, so the security of these two keys is interdependent; if 
one of them is compromised the other will be revealed.  
4.3.5. Key Revocation 
Key revocation is the deactivation of keys when they are no longer valid, for example, 
when the device (or entity) leaves the network. Key revocation has greater importance in public 
key cryptography but its significance cannot be ignored in symmetric cryptography. This is 
particularly important because the devices which are no longer the part of the network should not 
have network-specific secrets.  
In the WirelessHART network all keys except the Network key are device-specific. In 
order to maintain the authenticity of the WirelessHART network, when the device is captured 
either the device should self destruct [15] or the key should be automatically deleted from the 
device (WirelessHART Protocol does not provide any command to delete the Network key). 
Also, when the device permanently leaves the network (legally), the Network key should be 
changed.  
The only initial secret a device has is the Join key. The device uses this key to connect to 
the WirelessHART network and gets other secrets like the Network and session keys. If the 
device is captured and/or the Join key is exposed then there should be some mechanism(s) to 
revoke the Join key, i.e. to invalidate it in the Security Manager. In chapter 6 we will design and 
implement a Security Manager that will provide the key revocation mechanisms.        
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4.3.6. Key Vetting 
Key vetting is the verification or authentication of the security keys.  This terminology is 
more popular in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and is mainly used for the certificates. The 
WirelessHART does not provide any specific commands for the key vetting but some commands 
such as Report Device Health (Command 779) can help in key vetting. 
4.4. WirelessHART shortcomings regarding Key Management 
The WirelessHART network is a combination of wireless devices (Field Devices, 
Adapters, Routers, Access Points, and Handheld13) and the wired devices (Gateway, Network 
Manager, Security Manager, Handheld, Plant Automation Hosts, and industry specific devices). 
The security is enforced in the wireless devices with the limited key management mechanisms. 
The following table summarized the key management in the wireless devices:  
Key Management 
WirelessHART 
Solution 
Comments 
Key Generation No Not specified. 
Key Storage No Not specified. 
Key Distribution Limited 
Key distribution from the Network Manager (NM) to the 
devices is specified but the key distribution from the Security 
Manager to the NM is not specified. Key distribution for the 
Join key is not specified. 
Key Renewal Limited 
The WirelessHART provides solutions for the key renewal in 
the wireless network but does not specify how the keys are 
renewed in the Security Manager. 
Key Revoking No 
Key Revoking is not specified. There is a need for the Network 
Key and Join Key revoking. 
Key Vetting No No specific ways for key vetting. 
Table 6: Key Management in Wireless part of WirelessHART 
In the wired devices, the security is partial, i.e. the Gateway and Network Manager have 
data security (at Network Layer) but no communication security. Neither message security nor 
key management mechanisms are specified for the other wired devices.  
The above limitations show that the WirelessHART network needs a proper key 
management system for the enforcement of security in both the wireless and wired network. In 
Chapter 6 we will design and implement a Security Manager that will address the key 
                                                 
13 Handheld can act as both wired and wireless device. 
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management issues along with other unspecified security requirements. The provided Security 
Manager will be able to overcome these shortcomings. 
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CHAPTER 5: Integration of HART and 
WirelessHART networks 
 
WirelessHART is not a completely new protocol; rather it is a wireless extension to the 
Highway Addressable Remote Transducer (HART) protocol. The WirelessHART protocol was 
launched with the aim to complement the HART protocol by providing wireless extension to it. 
Since 1990, the HART protocol is available as an open protocol for industrial process automation 
and control. The latest version is HART 7.1, and includes wireless process data transmission and 
acquisition capabilities and formally named as WirelessHART. As the HART protocol is in use 
since last 20 years (approx.), there are huge industrial installations for this protocol throughout 
the world. Due to the different physical layer of the WirelessHART it is not directly compatible 
with the legacy HART 6 (and below). Also, the WirelessHART is a secure protocol while the 
legacy HART was not designed to be secured. 
    
In this chapter we will explore different options to securely integrate the WirelessHART 
and legacy HART networks, by retaining the standard compliance. The chapter will start with the 
commonalities and differences between HART and WirelessHART; afterward, the requirements 
for the integration will be explained; later in the chapter, the different integration options will be 
discussed.           
5.1. Commonalities between the HART and WirelessHART 
The HART (HART 6 and earlier) and WirelessHART (HART 7 and above) are used for 
industrial process automation and control. Some similarities that can help us while integrating the 
HART and WirelessHART networks are: 
 They are based on the OSI 7 layers architecture but the HART is loosely coupled while 
the WirelessHART is strongly coupled with the OSI architecture. Transport layer is the 
merge point of HART and WirelessHART i.e. both have identical Transport and higher 
layer (up to the Application layer) 
 The application layer for both of them consists of: Command No., Byte Count, and Data. 
 Both use 16 bit command number14 and most of the commands are shared between them. 
                                                 
14 Token Passing DLL natively supports only 8 bit command number but “Command Number Expansion Flag” 
containing 31 is used as command field to represent the use of a 16 bit command number. 
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5.2. Differences between the HART and WirelessHART 
Although the WirelessHART is an extension to the HART 6, the different physical layer 
has made the HART device/network difficult to integrate with the WirelessHART 
device/network. The following differences between the HART and WirelessHART protocols 
should be kept in mind while integrating the two networks/devices: 
 The HART Physical layer is 4-20mA analog wiring while WirelessHART physical layer 
uses IEEE 802.15.4-2006 (2.4 GHz) wireless interface. 
 The HART is based on Token Pass Data-Link layer while WirelessHART uses Time 
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) Data-link layer. 
 The HART does not precisely specify any Network or higher layer except Application 
layer while WirelessHART uses Network layer for wireless routing and end-to-end 
security. 
 Security is built into the WirelessHART standard while the HART protocol was not 
designed to be secured. 
 
Based on the protocol Data Units (PDUs), the general comparison between the HART and 
WirelessHART protocol is shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 9: Comparison of HART and WirelessHART PDUs 
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5.3. Needs for Integration 
As an extension to the HART protocol, the WirelessHART protocol should be able to 
support legacy HART devices and networks. Following are the few reasons that justify the 
requirement for the HART and WirelessHART integration. 
 One of the main reasons for integration is to provide support for millions of the available 
HART devices. The WirelessHART is the future choice for the industrial process 
automation and control system and due to its novel features the new manufacturing plants 
will definitely prefer the WirelessHART networks over the HART network. Currently 
there are millions of HART devices that should be able to work with the new 
WirelessHART network.   
 Hundreds of the HART based networks are installed and working properly. The HART 
network should be able to communicate with the WirelessHART network and vice versa, 
i.e. there is need for network-to-network integration. 
 The new WirelessHART devices should be compatible with both the HART and 
WirelessHART protocols because any of the new features (capabilities) of the 
WirelessHART device can be useful for the widely deployed HART network. In other 
words, the WirelessHART devices should provide backward compatibility. 
  Most of the people in the manufacturing industry are used to the HART bases 
devices/network and it is hard to educate them all on WirelessHART devices/network, so 
the WirelessHART network should support the legacy HART monitoring devices etc.  
5.4. Integrating HART and WirelessHART 
The WirelessHART protocol being the next version of the legacy HART protocol inherits 
many characteristics from it. In the previous sections we have seen the similarities and 
differences between the two protocols; also, we have realized and explained the need for 
integration of both the protocols to make the WirelessHART protocol a successful industrial 
standard. This need was also realized by the HART Communication Foundation (HCF) while 
defining the WirelessHART standard and hence HCF provides direct and indirect ways to 
integrate the two standards. The HCF provided mechanisms plus our recommended ways of 
integrating HART and WirelessHART will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
We may need to connect HART and WirelessHART in three ways: 
 HART device to WirelessHART Network 
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 HART Network to WirelessHART Network 
 WirelessHART device to HART Network 
5.4.1. HART device to WirelessHART Network 
WirelessHART is the modern solution for industrial process automation and different 
vendors including ABB, SIEMAND, Dust Network, EMERSON etc. are developing new devices 
based on this protocol; but millions of HART devices are already in the market and the industry is 
using them in manufacturing plants. If the WirelessHART does not provide alternative support 
for HART devices then either these devices should be equipped with IEEE 802.15.4 radio 
transmitters (not feasible) or become useless in the contemporary WirelessHART networks. 
Fortunately, the WirelessHART standard provides a direct, easy, reliable, and secure way of 
HART device(s) to WirelessHART network integration by using Adapters.  
An Adapter can be used to connect one (the HART network having point-to-point 
topology) or more (using multi-drop) HART enabled field devices with the WirelessHART 
Network. This is an elegant solution and it maintains the security and reliability of the 
WirelessHART network. We will not go in detail of the Adapter as its detailed specifications and 
capabilities can be found in [5].  
5.4.2. HART Network to WirelessHART Network Integration 
The HART and WirelessHART PDUs are different enough to make these protocols 
interoperable. The differences shown in section 5.2 do not allow the HART messages to be 
recognizable by the WirelessHART and vice versa. The Adapter provides direct integration but 
from device to network. We may need to connect the HART and WirelessHART networks. The 
WirelessHART standard does not provide any precise network-to-network integration rather it 
specifies the network topologies using different types of gateways. These topologies can be 
further refined to provide HART-to-WirelessHART integration.  
The gateway is a protocol converter that is used to communicate between the two 
networks which use different protocols. The WirelessHART standard already specifies the use of 
Gateway to convert IEEE 802.15.4.2006 (wireless devices-Field 
Devices/Adapter/Router/Handheld) based messages to Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Serial, or Proprietary core 
network (Network Manager, Security Manager, Host Applications, Asset Manager etc) messages 
and vice versa. The capabilities of this Gateway can be extended to provide communication 
between the HART and WirelessHART network. To support this kind of messaging, the 
WirelessHART gateway can be used: 
 In a PC card 
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 As a part of I/O subsystem 
 As a standalone device 
The HART network uses either point-to-point15 or multi-drop16 architecture, so the design of 
the WirelessHART Gateway varies according to the legacy HART network architecture. The 
objective to connect HART and WirelessHART also affects the design; if the purpose is to read 
data from the device then only basic read commands will be implemented in Gateway, otherwise 
any number of commands can be implemented and any interface can be provided. Some of the 
ways to integrate the HART and WirelessHART network using Gateway are: 
5.4.2.1. Gateway in PC card 
This solution is rather simple and easy. HART modems for PCs are already available and 
in use. These modems can be used to provide HART-to-Ethernet messaging. A HART-to-
WirelessHART gateway can be used as PC card to provide an interface between the two 
networks. This will be a feasible application-level solution as both HART and WirelessHART 
share Application layer specifications (see fig. 9). This can also be used to support applications 
like asset management etc. WirelessHART (HART 7) provides a number of commands that can 
be used to develop this architecture. The following figure shows this architecture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 In point-to-point architecture only one device can be connected in the current loop. In other words, the master has 
direct connection with only one device. 
16 In multi-drop architecture multiple devices can be connected to the current loop. Putting another way, one master can 
serve multiple clients. 
 
PC
HART Modem 
Ethernet Card 
WirelessHART Gateway 
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Figure 10: Integrating HART and WirelessHART using Gateway as PC card  
The above solution is feasible where the legacy HART network is already using a HART 
modem for integrating HART and Ethernet (or Wi-Fi, etc). Also, this approach can further 
simplify the WirelessHART network architecture if we use the Network Manager and Security 
Manager as applications in the same PC, where the gateway is plugged-in.     
5.4.2.2. Gateway as part of I/O sub-system 
Depending upon the available HART type (point-to-point and/or multi-drop) and network 
architecture, the WirelessHART Gateway can be used as a built-in component in I/O system. The 
HART I/O system may include Field controller, Multiplexer, Remote I/O, or a complete 
Distributed Control system (DCS). For the HART network, the I/O system is just another device 
and each I/O system must have one or more cards and each card must have one or more channels. 
Each channel supports one or more sub-devices (the HART devices). The WirelessHART 
Gateway will represent a card in this I/O system. This is definitely a good solution but now such a 
gateway will be useful for the specific legacy HART architecture. The Network Manager and 
Security Manager can exist inside the Gateway (the black box approach) or they can exist as two 
separate entities. The following diagram shows this architecture in action: 
 
Figure 11: Integrating HART and WirelessHART using Gateway as part of I/O subsystem 
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5.4.2.3. Standalone Gateway 
The third approach, which is rather clear in the standard, is to use a standalone gateway 
for integrating the WirelessHART with the widely installed HART network. In this approach the 
important decision is the point of interaction, i.e. the HART component; but it also depends on 
the HART architecture. In other words, the Gateway can be connected with any of the HART’s 
I/O system or Field Transmission Assembly (FTA) and on the basis of this connection the 
architecture varies. The presented solution in the WirelessHART standard connects the 
WirelessHART gateway with the FTA. This solution allows the reading of process information 
from one network to another. Here, the wireless Gateway implements commands for reading 
identity and process information. Also, the Gateway converts the HART PDU to the 
WirelessHART PDU and vice versa. The connecting cable can be any Recommended Standard 
(RS) specification but the WirelessHART recommends the use of RS48517 cable to establish 
connection between the FTA and the Gateway as RS485 supports Multi-drop and half duplex 
communication, and it has software flow control. 
The complete architecture for HART and WirelessHART integration is shown below 
which shows the point of integration along with other components needed to put the system in 
action. 
  
Figure 12: Integrating HART and WirelessHART using standalone Gateway 
                                                 
17 It specifies the electrical transmission and receiving of data (bytes) in bus.   
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5.4.3. WirelessHART device to HART Network 
The third way to connect HART and WirelessHART is to access data from the 
WirelessHART device (specifically made for WirelessHART network) in the legacy HART 
networks. This type of connection will be rarely required but it may be needed or useful in some 
specific situations.  
The manufacturing industry has shown greater interest in WirelessHART (HART 7) 
protocol and different vendors are manufacturing devices based on this protocol. The legacy 
HART devices are still available and new are coming in the market as well. But the 
manufacturers are showing interest in manufacturing new WirelessHART devices rather than 
legacy HART devices, unless or until legacy HART devices are required by the manufacturing 
plants. Currently the legacy HART based network does not require a new WirelessHART device 
to be integrated as part of its network; however, in future some WirelessHART devices may 
equipped with some specific feature(s) that is useful for the legacy HART network. In order to 
cater such needs the WirelessHART devices should support the current loop signaling.  
The WirelessHART standard does not recommend or specify such capabilities in the 
upcoming HART 7 devices but it provides indirect support (for legacy maintenance tools) that 
can help in integrating WirelessHART device with the HART network. Also, all field devices 
must implement Universal HART Commands; the commands 0-3, 11, and 13 in the 
WirelessHART specifications can be used to read identity and process variables from the 
WirelessHART device.  
Although this dual-featured device is needed in a very specific situation and it may be 
more expensive but it has the capabilities to work with both the HART and WirelessHART 
networks. 
5.5. Security in both standards 
Until now we have seen different options to connect HART and WirelessHART 
devices/networks but these solutions do not provide or enforce security in the integrated 
networks. One of the reasons why security is not easy to enforce is the different Physical layers 
but at the same time the common Application layers can help in enforcing security in the 
integrated network. In the next section we will specify one of the solutions to securely integrate 
(up to certain extent) HART and WirelessHART networks; but before going in details of the 
secure integration we should know the security mechanisms in both the protocols. In chapter 2 we 
have explained the security in the WirelessHART network and we refer to it as a revision for 
WirelessHART security; here we will discuss security in legacy HART protocol. 
KTH/SICS/ABB | WirelessHART Security 58 
 
Primarily, HART (version 6 and below) is an insecure protocol as no cryptographic 
security mechanisms are used to protect the messaging among the different HART network 
components. The Error detection mechanisms are used but they check only for communication 
errors, providing no Integrity, Confidentiality, Authentication, etc of data. The HART 6 uses 
single parity check coding schemes [17] to perform communication error detection. This scheme 
adds an overhead of 1 bit after each 8 bits. The detail about this scheme can be found in “Token-
Passing Data Link Layer Specifications (HCF_SPEC-81)”. The following figure shows this 
scheme. 
 
5.6. Secure Integration 
The secure way to integrate a HART device with the WirelessHART network is to extend 
the capabilities of conventional Adapters and use them as integrators. The WirelessHART 
specifications clearly explain the requirements and uses of Adapters. The Adapters are not 
specified as tools to integrate the HART and WirelessHART networks but are devices to connect 
the legacy HART device with the WirelessHART network. 
If the security and reliability are the main objectives while integrating HART and 
WirelessHART networks, the use of specialized Adapters will be a good choice.  The Gateway 
can be used as integrator but the reasons why the use of powerful Adapter(s) as integrators is a 
better idea are as follows: 
 The wireless Gateway already has a wired/Wi-Fi connection with the other 
devices/networks such as Network Manager, Host applications, and access points; so it is 
sometime not feasible to connect the Gateway with the HART network (through FTA) 
using RS485 wiring. In other words, the physical location of the Gateway and FTA may 
not permit them to be connected. 
Figure 13: Communication Error Detection schemes in HART 6 and below [18] 
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 In the Multi-drop architecture, more than one device is connected to the current loop and 
thus to a single Adapter. In point-to-point architecture, only one device is connected with 
a current loop; but the new Adapters can be designed to allow connection to multiple 
current loops.  
 Unlike Gateways, Adapters are portable and the change of physical location will not 
require addition wiring as it will have only one physical link. 
 Unlike conventional Adapters18, the new proposed Adapters will be connected to one of 
the HART master device. The number of slave devices connected to a current loop varies 
from 0 to 275,000,000,000 but normally 15 devices are connected to a Multi-drop current 
loop (to keep noise in transmission down). 
 The new Adapters can be connected with any of the wired HART components such as 
FTA, Remote I/O, Field Controllers, and DCS; but the security will decrease as we move 
away from the actual devices i.e. the security will be high if the new Adapter is connected 
directly with the master device which in turn is connected with the actual device. 
 The legacy HART network will operate as it is, with the additional capabilities to read 
data from the WirelessHART devices, and the contemporary WirelessHART network 
will be able to access legacy HART devices. In other words, this is a two-way solution 
with full device access capabilities. 
 If the gateway is used for integration, its architecture will be complex and expansive. 
Such gateways are specialized and it will not be feasible to use them in situations where 
integration is not required. 
 The new Adapter can be used for messaging between the two HART devices if more than 
one adapter is used to integrate the whole HART network. The two HART devices 
communicate at a data rate of 1200 bit/s but the two Adapters will communicate at 250 
Kbit/s. Along with providing integration capabilities, the new HART adapter will be a 
good choice to provide high data rate among legacy HART devices. 
 The WirelessHART specifications thoroughly explains the requirements for the simple 
Adapter; these requirements can be extended with new specifications rather than 
inventing the wheel again (with regard to gateway level integration).  
The above explanations justify the use of (new powerful) adapters as network integrators. Fig 
13 shows this architecture. The HART Master in the figure can be any of the I/O system, FTA, 
DCS, Field controller, etc. The choice of Master device will affect the security, i.e. closer the 
                                                 
18 Which are connected directly to the current loop. 
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integrator/Adapter to the slaves, sooner the HART message (unsecure) will be converted to 
WirelessHART message (secure and reliable). 
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Rest of HART
network
 
Figure 14: Secure Integration of the HART and WirelessHART nwtworks 
The above architecture is a competitive solution and the well designed 
Integrator/Adaptors can be used to securely integrate the HART and the WirelessHART network. 
Such Adapters can surely be created by following the WirelessHART standard and enhancing the 
conventional Adapters. 
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CHAPTER 6: Design and Implementation of 
Security Manager 
 
The Security Manager is an integral device of the WirelessHART network. According to 
the WirelessHART standard, the core responsibility of the Security Manager is to manage keys. 
The standard only defines the messaging in the wireless medium and not the wired medium. Due 
to the sensitive nature of the manufacturing plants, the communication medium from the Field 
device (wireless) to the Host applications (wired) must be secured and provide fail proof 
reliability. 
In the previous chapters we have explained the security in the WirelessHART, figured 
out the key management requirements for the complete WirelessHART network, and provided 
the means to securely integrate the HART and WirelessHART networks. In this chapter we will 
design a Security Manager that will not only meet the security requirements of the wireless 
medium but also be able to secure the communication in the wired medium of the WirelessHART 
network. We will define the requirement specifications of the Security Manager but first describe 
some of the unique features of the WirelessHART network. 
6.1. Some critical points about the WirelessHART network 
Following are the important characteristics of the WirelessHART network that we have to 
keep in mind while designing and implements the Security Manager for the WirelessHART 
network; these characteristics are the prerequisites of the WirelessHART network design and 
hence the Security Manager. 
 
 There is only one Security Manager for the whole WirelessHART network.  
 One Security Manager can serve more than one WirelessHART network. 
 The Security manager is an application that meets the security needs of the wireless 
network. The Security Manager can reside in a standalone device; it can consist of one or 
more functions in host applications; and/or it can be integrated in the black box consisting 
of Gateway, Network Manager, and Security Manager.    
 More than one Network Manager can be used to serve the WirelessHART network (for 
redundancy) but there must be only one active Network Manager for the single 
WirelessHART network. 
 There is only one active gateway per WirelessHART network. 
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 Direct communication between the Security Manager and wireless devices (Field Device, 
Adapter, Router, Access Point, and wireless Handheld) is not allowed. In other words, the 
Security Manager cannot create sessions with the wireless devices. The Security Manager 
will provide security keys to the Network Manager and the Network Manager will 
distribute the keys to the respective wireless devices. 
 The Security Manager is completely hidden from the Gateways.[5] 
 The interface between the Security Manager and Network Manager is not defined by the 
WirelessHART standard. 
 The Security Manager and Network Manager will work together in a client-server19 
fashion. 
 Also, the interface between the Gateway and Network Manager is not defined. 
 According to the WirelessHART standard, the link between the Security Manager and 
Network Manager, the Network Manager and Gateway, and the Gateway and Host 
applications must be secured; but the WirelessHART standard does not provide any 
means to secure these communication links. 
 Although the WirelessHART standard specifies the functions of the Network Manager 
and Gateway (and, to a lesser extent, Security Manager), it does not specify the 
architecture of the Gateway, Network Manager, and Security Manager. 
Based on these prerequisites, our proposed Security Manager is directly connected with the 
Network Manager at one end and with the wired/core network at the other end. Such a Security 
Manager is capable of serving both the wired and wireless networks. Also, the Security Manager 
can serve more than one Network Manager, but now the other Network Managers should be 
connected to the core network at one end (the other end may be connected with the Gateway). 
Figure 15 below shows the placement of the Security Manager and its connection with other 
WirelessHART network components. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 The Security Manager will act as server and the Network Manager will act as client. 
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Figure 15: Placement of Security Manager in the complete WirelessHART plus HART network 
In the next section we will elaborate the specifications for the Security Manager by 
keeping in mind the above mentioned constraints and that the Security Manager should secure 
communication in both the wireless and wired/core networks. 
6.2. Security Manager Specifications 
The Security Manager is stated as an integral part of the WirelessHART network but unlike 
Network Manager, Gateway, Field Devices, Adapters, and Handheld devices, the requirements 
and functions of the Security Manager are not clearly defined by the WirelessHART standard. In 
this section we will find out the possible specifications of the Security Manager that can assist the 
working of the complete WirelessHART network. The broader capabilities of the Security 
Manager include: 
6.2.1. Key Manager for the wireless medium 
In order to meet the security requirement of the wireless medium, the WirelessHART 
standard specifies the need of a Security Manager that acts as a Key Distribution Center (KDC) 
and key manager. On one hand the use of a centralized KDC is an easy and secure way for the 
key management but on the other hand it is a single point of failure. To serve the wireless 
network, the Security Manager will generate, store, renew, revoke, and vet the Join key, Session 
Keys, Handheld key, and Network key; and distribute them to the wireless devices through 
Network Manager. These functionalities are elaborated below:  
6.2.1.1. As key generator/provider 
KTH/SICS/ABB | WirelessHART Security 64 
 
The Security manager will generate the keys for each of the wireless device based on 
Network Manager’s request. The Join key is a special Master key which is initially generated by 
the Security Administrator and is added in the actual device through the device maintenance port. 
The device tries to join the WirelessHART network using the Join key and the associated 
information (discussed below). The joining request is encrypted with the Join key. At the 
Network Manager the join request is decrypted with the Join key received from the Security 
Manager. On successful decryption the Network Manager requests the Network and session keys 
from the Security Manager and distributes them to the actual device using special commands 
defined in Chapter 4. The Network Manager requests for the specific keys by providing the: 
 Network ID: It is the unique identification of the WirelessHART network. 
 Device Nickname: The 2-bytes Nickname is the unique identification of the network 
device maintained by the Network Manager. The Unique ID (UID) can be used to 
uniquely identify the devices but UIDs are maintained by the Gateway. The client for the 
Security Manager is the Network Manager but not the Gateway and hence the Nicknames 
are used to identify the devices in the Security Manager. For the Join key the device’s 
unique name (set by vendor) will be used as the Nickname because the actual Nickname 
is not available at the beginning and it is later set by the Network Manager. 
 Key Type:  The key type can be one of the seven key types namely Network, Join, 
Handheld, Network Manager Unicast, Gateway Unicast, Network Manager Broadcast, 
Gateway Broadcast. All keys needed for the wireless devices are unsigned 128 bit long 
AES keys. 
 Password [optional]: If the Security Manager is maintained by the third party then the 
generated security keys (Network and session keys) can be protected by the password 
provided by the Network Manager. This password can either be provided at the time of 
establishing a secure connection between the Network Manager and the Security 
Manager if all the keys are protected by the same password, or it can also be provided at 
the time of requesting a key if each key is protected with the different passwords. See 
section 6.3.5 for more details. 
 
 
 
6.2.1.2. As key storage tool 
The Security Manager will be responsible for the secure storage of all the generated keys 
and associated information. For a specific key, the Security Manager needs to store the:  
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 Network ID 
 Nickname i.e. The ID of the device 
 Key Value i.e. the actual key 
 Key Type 
 Generation Date 
 Expiry Data 
 
All the keys are stored in one or more secure storages which are protected by storage 
level passwords and the related information are stored in plaintext in the database. The Security 
Administrator is responsible for creating a secure storage and setting the storage password. Each 
key in the store is protected by a password and these password(s) are either managed by the 
Security Manager or by the Network Manager. It all depends on the level of trust the Network 
Manager has on the Security Administrator. If the password used to protect the individual keys is 
provided by the Network Manager then the Security Manager will be unable to see the actual 
keys; the Network Manager can use a single password to protect all the keys. 
Alternatively, the Security Manager maintains all the keys and the associated passwords 
and the Network Manager contains the private key and the certificates for establishing a secure 
connection. The Network Manager uses these credentials to connect to the Security Manager and 
on successful connection the Security Manager loads associated storage into its volatile memory. 
This approach is simpler than previous but here the Network Manager(s) fully trust(s) the 
Security Manager/Administrator.  
6.2.1.3. As key renewal tool 
As a key renewal tool the Security Manager will be able to renew the existing keys. All 
keys including Join Key can be renewed. A key will be renewed when: 
 The key has expired. (The Security Administrator will choose the expiry date) 
 The Security Administration initiates a renewal request.  
 The Network Manager sends a renewal request. 
Normally the Security Manager works in Server mode and responds only when it gets a 
request from Network Manager, but the Security Manager can initiate a key renewal request to 
Network Manager (by providing device Nickname and key type), when the key is about to expire 
or the Security Administrator wants to change the key. In response, the Network Manager should 
send a key renewal request to the Security Manager by providing the Network ID, Nickname, 
Key Type, and the password (optional). The Security Manager will generate a new key, revoke 
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old key, and send the renewed key to the Network Manager. Lastly, the Network Manager will 
write the received key in the wireless device by sending appropriate key/session write command 
to the device (see chapter 4).  
The key renewal request can be initiated by the Network Manager. In this case the Network 
Manager will send the device’s Nickname, Network ID, Key Type, and optionally password to 
the Security Manager and the Security Manager will respond with the renewed key. Figure 18 
shows the pictorial representation of the key renewal process.   
6.2.1.4. As key revocation tool 
In order to revoke the keys the Security Manager will remove the key from the keystore 
and its corresponding entry from the key database. The revocation request is generated by the 
Network Manager (the security administrator can revoke the Join key). The Network Manager 
will send the Network ID, Nickname, key type, and key password and in return the Security 
Manager will delete the corresponding keys from the key store and its associated information 
from the database. 
6.2.2. Security Manager as Certification Authority 
In order to provide Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) capabilities in the wired part of the 
network, Security Manager will act as Certification Authority (CA). It will be capable of 
generating, distributing, verifying, and revoking digital certificates. The Security Manager will 
create signed certificate(s) for the Network Manager, Gateway, Host Applications, Process 
Automation Controller (PAC), and/or any future WirelessHART network entity that securely 
want to communicate with other network entities. The created certificates and the associated keys 
will be distributed to the devices manually. Later, the application can confirm the validity of the 
destination entity’s certificate (i.e. Public key) by verifying the digital signature of the Security 
Manager20 on it. If any of the asymmetric private keys are exposed, the Security Manager will 
generate a new private key and corresponding certificate, distribute it, and revoke the old one by 
publishing the Key Revocation Lists (CRLs). Key revocation is also performed when a legitimate 
Public key holder is no longer the trusted entity i.e. leaves the system. 
6.2.2.1. Secure Channel between the Security and Network Manager 
The Security Manager will create a secure session between the Network Manager and 
Security Manager using the combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. To 
establish such a secure channel the Security Manager needs a trusted Public Key of Network 
                                                 
20 Security Manager will create self signed certificate for itself and the corresponding Private key. This Private key is 
used for signing certificates and Session key encryption.  
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Manager and vice versa. Also, both the Security Manager and Network Manager require secret 
Private Keys; later on, for the data encryption they also require a symmetric key. The Security 
Manager will create a self signed certificate and corresponding Private key for itself. The Security 
Manager will create a signed certificate and associated Private key for the Network Manager and 
send it using some secure manual way e.g. CD/DVD, Floppy Disk, or even in Smartcard. The 
Network Manager should have a secure way of storing Private Key. The Security Manager will 
store its Private key in a secure key store. 
6.2.2.2. Secure session between Gateway and Host Applications 
The Security Manager will also act as a cryptographic parameters provider to Gateway 
and Host Application. Theses parameters will help when establishing a secure session between 
them. The Gateway and Host application devices will receive the Private keys from the Security 
Manager. The keys will be distributed to them over a manual channel such as CD, USB Drive, or 
even in Smartcard. The Gateway and Host Applications will get the signed certificates from the 
Security Manager as well. These cryptographic parameters will help the Gateway and Host device 
to create a secure private session.    
6.2.2.3. Secure session between the Gateway and Network Manager 
If the Gateway and Network Manager are not integrated, they can use the asymmetric 
cryptographic parameters (certificates and keys) already provided to them by the Security 
Manager to establish a secure session. Both Gateway and NM must have capabilities to securely 
store certificates and Private key.  
6.3. Designing of Security Manager 
In section 6.2 we have given the detailed specifications of the Security Manager and the 
interfacing between the Security Manager and Network Manager. In this section we will design a 
Security Manager and represent its functions and collaboration with other Network devices in 
Unified Markup Language (UML). 
6.3.1. Security Manager Use-case Diagram 
The Use-case diagram is the combination of actors (normally outside the system) and 
their interaction with the system functionalities (called use cases); it also shows the collaboration 
among the use cases. The actors that can interact with the Security Manager are: 
Security Administrator: They are responsible for the administration of the Security Manager 
which includes: 
KTH/SICS/ABB | WirelessHART Security 68 
 
 Generation of Join keys 
 Renewal/revocation of Join Keys. (The Join key can also be renewed when it is about to 
expire or when Network Manager sends a renewal request) 
 Creation of secure storage(s) 
 Performing back-ups 
 Creating, signing, revoking, and distributing security certificates 
 
Network Manager: The Network Manager can request for: 
 Any of the predefined Join keys 
 The generation of Network and session keys 
 Any of the generated keys 
 Renewal of any key (including Join key) 
 Revocation of any key   
The use-cases for the Security Manager are grouped into two packages:  
KeyManager: It serves the Network Manager and manages the symmetric keys needed to secure 
the communication among the wireless devices, Gateway, and Network Manager. The functions 
of the KeyMana ger include: random generation, secure storage, renewal, revocation, and 
distribution of symmetric keys. These functionalities are explained in detail in section 6.2.1.     
Certification Authority (CA): The CA is responsible for securing the communication in the 
wired/core medium. This approach is based on asymmetric cryptography where the public keys 
(certificates) and the corresponding private keys are used to secure the communication. Every 
device in the wired/core network will trust on the security certificate signed with the Security 
Manager’s private key. As a CA, the Security Manager will be responsible for:  
 Creation of its own certificate (Self-Signed certificate)  
 Issuance of signed certificates to the other network devices  
 Noting the requests for the new certificates from the newly join devices (in the wired 
network) 
 Revocation of the Security Manager signed certificates held by the devices which are no 
more the part of the WirelessHART network. 
 Creation of key store (for storing Private keys) and trust stores (for storing Security 
Manager signed certificates) 
 Exploration/Investigation of stored certificates (by Security Administrator). 
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The following use-case diagram shows all the actors, use-cases, and the interaction among 
them.  
Figure 16: Use-case diagram for Security Manager 
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6.3.2. Key Request 
The Network Manager relies on the Security Manager for all the keys (except the Well-
known key). The Network Manager needs session keys (Network Manager---Unicast and 
Broadcast) to decrypt the Network Protocol Data Unit (NPDU) messages from the field devices 
and Gateway. The Network Manager gets these keys from the Security Manager by sending a key 
request. Also, the Network Manager requests the keys (Handheld, Network, and Gateway 
sessions) that are later distributed to the relevant devices to enable secure wireless 
communication. The following diagram (Figure 17) shows a key request process in detail. 
 
 
Figure 17: The Key Request Process 
6.3.3. Key Renewal 
All the keys in the WirelessHART network can be renewed. The figure 18 below shows 
the key renewal process when the request is initiated by Security Administrator (the Security 
Administrator can request only the changing of the Join key). This diagram also depicts the 
renewal process when the request is generated by the Security Manager (when the key expires) or 
by the Network Manager. The Security Manager will not change the key until or unless it 
receives a renewal request from the Network Manager;21 this is because the Network Manager 
has to write the changed key into the actual device (as the Security Manager cannot make 
sessions with the field devices and Gateway). 
                                                 
21 . When the device is not connected with the WirelessHART network, the Security Manager can change the Join key 
without intimating the Network Manager; and write it in the actual device. 
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Figure 18: Key Renewal Process 
6.3.4. Key Revocation 
The key revocation is simply a deletion of keys from the secure storage and its related 
information from the database. The key revocation request can be generated by the Network 
Manager or the Security Administrator. On receiving a revocation request the Security manager 
will delete its stored key and respond with the success or failure message. The key revocation is 
needed when the device leaves the network (All keys will revoked) or the Handheld device to 
Field device (peer-to-peer) session expires (only Handheld key is revoked). The key revocation 
process is simple compared to key renewal. Figure 19 below shows the key revocation process for 
the symmetric wireless keys. 
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Figure 19: Key Revocation Process 
6.3.5. Key Generation 
The data that flows through the WirelessHART network is secured using 128 bit AES 
keys. The security of the whole system depends upon the security of the keys. The keys should be 
strong enough that it should not be breakable within the time when the information to be revealed 
is effective. Also the cost of making an attack successful should be more than the worth of 
information the attacker will reveal. AES 128 is recommended by the NIST USA and still 
considered as strong enough and it is hard (in terms of time and cost) to break it using brute force 
attack within an effective time. But if the generated keys are not random enough other statistical 
attacks can break the keys in less time and with few resources [24]. In other words, the key 
generation mechanisms should be based on secure random/pseudorandom sources to create a 
random key. 
For the secure communication in WirelessHART network, the first key the device should 
be provisioned with is the Join Key and the first key the Network Manager needs is the Network 
Key. For generating the Join key, the real random sources such as thermal noise, gas discharge 
tubes, response time of hard disk sector reading [25] etc. can be used. For test purposes, the 
secure random source can be a key password (secure) and current system time in milliseconds 
(random). Later on, the Join key combined with random source can be used for generating other 
session keys. For the Network key the real random source can be combined with Administrator’s 
password. 
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The password and current time in milliseconds (or output of other random sources) are 
passed through a mixing function (concatenation) to get a secure random output. Sometime the 
random sources may get biased and produce uneven output containing series of ones or zeros. To 
overcome this, the output is hashed to get random distribution of ones and zeros.  
In actual implementation, the pseudorandom number generator we will use is 
cryptographically strong as it complies with section 4.9.1 of FIPS 140-2 (Security Requirements 
for Cryptographic Modules). Also, the final random number will comply with the Randomness 
Recommendations for Security defined in the RFC 1750. The minimum length of the password is 
set to eight characters (alphanumeric) which will be hashed to produce 128 bit random source for 
generating the Join and Network keys (which will be later used to generate session keys). The 
following figure shows one such scenario where the password and random sources are first 
concatenated, hashed, and then used as input to the key generating function as random source. 
 
  
Figure 20: Key generation scenario 
6.3.6. Key Distribution 
The Security Manager is responsible for providing keys to the Network Manager and the 
Network Manager will distribute them to the actual devices using well defined commands (see 
section 4.3.3). For the new Field devices/Gateway, the Security Manager will provide the Join 
key that will be written into the actual device by the Handheld device using device’s maintenance 
port. The Security Administrator is responsible for generating the Join key and provisioning the 
device with it. For details see section 6.3.1.   
6.3.7. Key Storage 
The Security Admin registers the new device in the WirelessHART Network by 
generating and adding the Join key and related information in the secure storage and plain 
KTH/SICS/ABB | WirelessHART Security 74 
 
database. The actual key is stored in the key store in an encrypted form. The keys in the store are 
protected by the key password and the whole storage is protected by the storage password. The 
information associated with a specific key is stored in the plain database protected by database 
password; this information includes: 
 Key Store Aliases (Alias for the key store where actual key is stored in a protected form)  
 Network ID 
 Device Nickname 
 Key Type 
 Generation Date 
 Expiry Date 
The storage password and the key password(s) are shared between the Security Administrator and 
the Network Manager/Administrator. The Network Manager provides the storage password at the 
time of connectivity (with Security Manager) and key password at the time of key request, 
renewal, and revocation. If every stored key is encrypted with different password then the 
Network Manager has to keep track of all the passwords; so in practice, all keys are encrypted 
with a single password which the Network Administrator enters at the time of launching Network 
Manager application and this password stays in the volatile memory as long as the Network 
Manager is running. The Security Administrator can request, renew, and revoke the Join key 
only; but like Network Manager it needs to remember the storage and key passwords. 
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Figure 21: Key Storage Model 
6.3.8. Security Manager as CA 
As a CA, the Security Manager will generate its own self signed certificate, listen for 
certification requests, issue signed certificates to all other core/wired network devices, revoke 
certificates when they are no longer valid, and provide mechanisms for secure storage of 
certificates and related credentials. The network devices will use these certificates and Private 
keys to secure the communication in the wired part of the WirelessHART network. The functions 
of the CA and its interaction with the other network components are shown in figure 16 (use case 
diagram for security Manager).  
 
The figure 22 below shows the class diagram of the Security Manager. The Session 
Manager class is not implemented here because we rely on Metro for establishing secure 
communication between the Web Service and its clients using certificates and keys we have 
specified (see section 6.4). The communication between the other wired network devices (e.g 
Gateway-Network Manager and Gateway-Host Applications) can be secured using SSL protocol 
(as all the devices have the certificates and corresponding Private Keys, provided to them by the 
Security Manager). 
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Figure 22: Security Manager Class diagram 
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6.4. Implementation of Security Manager 
The Security Manager and the Network Manager are two separate entities that may be 
located at two different locations and the software and hardware used for both may vary. Also, 
the WirelessHART standard does not specify the interface between the two. So the Security 
Manager implementation should be platform independent and it should be interoperable with the 
technologies used to implements the Network Managers and other network entities. 
There are different technologies to achieve interoperability e.g. CORBA, RMI over IIOP, 
Web Services etc.; but the web service is a widely used technology for exporting the 
functionalities of an application to the other applications located on a local or remote machines, 
by providing platform independence and interoperability. Web services architecture is platform 
independent and interoperable meaning that the systems running different operating systems and 
using different languages can interact with each other using an XML based common interface 
called Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [23]. The actual service is described in platform-
independent Web Services Description Language (WSDL) [22]. Different programming 
languages provide APIs to develop web services. Also, there are tools from different vendors that 
facilitate the development of web services.  
In the past security was a serious issue in web services because the two different 
technologies at two ends should follow the same security protocol; this was hard to achieve until 
Sun Microsystems and Microsoft worked closely to overcome interoperability issued in the 
enterprise technologies such as security and reliability. As a result of this coordination, Sun 
Microsystems (Glassfish communality) developed a web services stack named Metro [19].       
For the new WirelessHART standard we will use the security enabled web services 
architecture named Metro 1.4 from Glassfish community. The Security Manager consists of two 
web services that will implement the CA and Key Manager functionalities defined in the class 
diagram above (see figure 22). 
6.4.1. Technologies Used 
Following tools and technologies are used to implement the Security Manager and related 
applications, and these are required to run and deploy the applications. 
 NetBeans IDE 6.1 or higher (http://www.netbeans.org/) 
 GlassFish v2 or higher (http://java.sun.com/javaee/community/glassfish/) 
 Metro 1.4 (https://metro.dev.java.net/1.4/) 
 Windows/Linux/Solaris/Mac OS 
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 Java Crypto APIs from Bouncy Castle 
(http://www.bouncycastle.org/latest_releases.html) 
 JDK 6 (http://java.sun.com/javase/downloads/index.jsp) 
6.4.2. Applications developed 
The implementation consists of following application: 
 SecurityManager: This is the core Security Manager application; it is primarily 
consists of two web services namely: 
o KeyManager: To serve wireless network (see figure below) 
o WirelessHARTCA: To serve wired network (see figure below) 
 
 NetworkManager: It is a dummy22 Network Manager that can 
request/renew/revoke 128 bit AES keys by interacting with KeyManager web 
service. 
 SecurityAdmin: It provides a web based administrative console to the Security 
Administrative that can use it to manage the Security Manager and secure the 
wired/core network using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). See figure 22 for its 
capabilities. 
  
                                                 
22 The core functions of the Network Manager are not provided; it just contains the functions needed to 
interact with the Security Manager. 
KTH/SICS/ABB | WirelessHART Security 79 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work 
 
The WirelessHART standard is developed by the HART Communication Foundation 
consisting of best minds working in their specialized fields in the industry (especially in process 
automation and control). The WirelessHART specifications are almost complete in all aspects 
except security. The security in the complete WirelessHART network is not specified but the 
security in the wireless medium is specified and enforced. Also, the provided security is spread 
throughout the WirelessHART specifications and the standard lacks a comprehensive document 
that explains and specifies the security. The WirelessHART has been recently released and to the 
best of our knowledge we are the first one who have explained, analyzed, integrated, and 
implemented (in the form of Security Manager) the security features of the WirelessHART 
standard. 
According to our analysis the provided security in the wireless medium although subjected to 
some threats due to its wireless nature is strong enough to be used in the industrial process control 
environment. In order to avoid sybil attack at Physical layer (which will lead to other attack) the 
physical protection of the WirelessHART devices is very necessary (see section 2.4.1.3). Also, 
the careful implementation of the Network Manager is very important: the key renewal should be 
automatic and periodic. Active administration is needed at both ends: Network Manager and 
Security Manager. Although the WirelessHART can coexist with other wireless technologies 
using frequency diversity, time diversity, and path diversity but still try to avoid huge installation 
of other wireless technologies using the same frequency band in and around the manufacturing 
plant. The security of the whole system in turn depends upon the passwords used to secure the 
keys and the key stores. These passwords must be kept secret, long (with alphabets and digits), 
and random enough. The Security and Network administrators should be very carefully against 
social engineering attacks. 
To the best of our evaluation abilities and knowledge the proposed solution to secure the 
wired medium is strong enough to provide all core security services including confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation that are necessary to securely communicate in the 
wired medium. The web services based solution solves the issues of platform independence and 
interoperability; also, the Security Manager is comprehensive enough to publish its functionalities 
to the rest of the world with full security and reliability. 
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Future work in this area includes:   
 All of our proposed strategies comply with the WirelessHART standard and can be used 
to secure the WirelessHART network. The future specification can use the reserved 
security bits and specify the ways to provide the Authorization and Accounting services 
(if the cost of WirelessHART device is attached to its usage) services. There is a need for 
new WirelessHART commands to enforce these services; e.g. a command for key vetting 
capabilities should be provided. These reserved bits can be effectively used to introduce 
asymmetric cryptography in the WirelessHART network. 
 The proposed technique for the secure integration can be further refined by studying the 
legacy HART protocol in detail. 
 When we were researching and developing secure features for the WirelessHART there 
were no actual WirelessHART network installations, so in future the proposed security 
solution and implemented Security Manager can be tested in real world to evaluate and 
enhance its performance. 
 
To summarize, it is very important to test the working of whole network with full security at 
both wireless and wired medium by using the implemented Security Manager, actual Network 
Manager, Gateway, field device, and Host applications. 
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Appendix A: How to Run 
 
In order to run and test the implemented Security Manager, please follow the following 
steps. 
1. Install and Run NetBeans IDE with GlassFish server 
2. Open SecurityManager application in NetBeans IDE 
3. Right click the SecurityManager project node and click properties and then select 
Libraries 
4. Click Add JAR/Folder button and provide path to the downloaded Bouncy Castle 
APIs (see section 6.4.1) and click open. Click Ok to add the library.  
5. Right click the SecurityManager node and click Run. The GalssFish will be 
automatically started. Enter the default username (admin) and password 
(adminadmin) for the GlassFish server. 
6. Open the SecurityAdmin Application 
7. Right click the SecurityAdmin project node and click Run. The administrative 
consoles will appear. 
8. Use the SecurityAdmin to  
a. Create secure key stores. 
b. Create self-signed certificate; it will act as CA certificate. 
c. Create a signed certificate for the SecurityAdmin. Add the signed 
certificate and the corresponding key in the Security Administrator key 
store. 
d. Create a signed certificate for the Network Manager. Provide the signed 
certificate and the corresponding Private Key to the Network Manager 
(manually in disk or smart card). 
9. Select the web services node in SecurityManager project. Right click the web 
services (one after another) and select “Edit Web Services Attributes”. 
10. Select the “Secure Service” checkbox and uncheck the “Use development 
defaults”. 
11. From the combo box select “Mutual Certificates Security” (other options can be 
used). 
12. Click keystore button and provide the newly created keystore location and related 
details and click OK. Also click OK to close the configuration dialog. 
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13.   From the SecurityAdmin/NetworkManager project select “Web Service 
References”. Right click the service tab and select “Edit Web Services 
Attributes”. Enable the security and click OK. 
14. Run both the clients (SecurityAdmin and Network Manager) again to enable the 
security features. 
15. Now the whole system is running with full security. You can also configure 
reliability using “Edit Web Services Attributes”. 
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Appendix B: SecurityManager Web Services Code 
 
The code for the two web services (KeyManager and WirelessHARTCA) is provided by the 
SecurityManager Application is pasted here; the code for the client applications: SecurityAdmin 
and Network Manager will be provided on request. Direct your request to sraza@kth.se 
  
1. KeyManager Service 
/* 
 * This service will be used to serve wireless part of the WirelessHART network. 
 * Only Network Manager should access this service directly. 
 */ 
package sics.shahid.keymanager; 
 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.FileInputStream; 
import java.io.FileOutputStream; 
import javax.jws.WebMethod; 
import javax.jws.WebParam; 
import javax.jws.WebService; 
import javax.crypto.KeyGenerator; 
import java.security.*; 
import java.sql.Connection; 
import java.sql.Date; 
import java.sql.DriverManager; 
import java.sql.ResultSet; 
import java.sql.SQLException; 
import java.sql.Statement; 
import javax.crypto.SecretKey; 
import sics.shahid.additional.Messages; 
 
/** 
 * 
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 * @author Shahid Raza 
 */ 
@WebService() 
public class KeyManager implements Messages { 
 
    boolean loginStatus = false; 
    int keyType = 0; 
    Connection connection = null; 
    Statement statement = null; 
    String keyStorePassword = null, 
            networkID = null, 
            deviceNickname = null, 
            keyPassword = null, 
            keyStorePath = null; 
    KeyStore keyStore = null; 
 
    /** 
     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "loginToStorage") 
    public String loginToStorage(@WebParam(name = "ksName") String ksName, 
                                 @WebParam(name = "ksLocation")String ksLocation, 
                                 @WebParam(name = "ksPass") String ksPass) { 
        String hashedPass = null; 
        String storedPassword = null; 
        try { 
            MessageDigest hash = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1"); 
            hash.update(ksPass.getBytes()); 
            hashedPass = new String(hash.digest()); 
 
            makeSQL(); 
            ResultSet rs = statement.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM KEYSTORES where NAME='" + 
                    ksName + "' AND PASSWORD='" + hashedPass + "'"); 
            if (rs.next() == true) { 
                loginStatus = true; 
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                keyStorePath = rs.getString("LOCATION") + ksName + ".jceks"; 
                storedPassword = rs.getString("PASSWORD"); 
                if (hashedPass.equals(storedPassword) == false) { 
                    return PASSWORD_MSG + " but found in database"; 
                } 
                keyStorePassword = ksPass; 
                keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("JCEKS"); 
                FileInputStream in = new FileInputStream(new File(keyStorePath)); 
                keyStore.load(in, keyStorePassword.toCharArray()); 
                in.close(); 
                rs.close(); 
                return "SUCCESS"; 
            } else { 
                return PASSWORD_MSG; 
            } 
        } catch (Exception ee) { 
            ee.printStackTrace(); 
            System.out.println("Exception in Login..........."); 
        } 
        return ERROR_MSG; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "requestKey") 
    public byte[] requestKey(@WebParam(name = "networkID") String networkID, 
                       @WebParam(name = "deviceNickname") String deviceNickname, 
                       @WebParam(name = "keyType") int keyType, 
                       @WebParam(name = "keyPassword") String keyPassword) { 
        if (loginStatus == false) { 
            return "Please Login".getBytes(); 
        } 
        byte[] key = null; 
        this.networkID = networkID; 
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        this.deviceNickname = deviceNickname; 
        this.keyType = keyType; 
        this.keyPassword = keyPassword; 
        key = retriveKey(); 
        if (key == null) { 
            key = generateKey(); 
            System.out.println("Requested Key =" + new String(key)); 
        } 
        return key; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "renewKey") 
    public byte[] renewKey(@WebParam(name = "networkID") String networkID, 
                       @WebParam(name = "deviceNickname") String deviceNickname, 
                       @WebParam(name = "keyType") int keyType, 
                       @WebParam(name = "keyPassword") String keyPassword) { 
        this.networkID = networkID; 
        this.deviceNickname = deviceNickname; 
        this.keyType = keyType; 
        this.keyPassword = keyPassword; 
        byte[] keyToBeRenewed = null; 
        FileInputStream in = null; 
        byte[] newKey = null; 
        try { 
            keyToBeRenewed = retriveKey(); 
            if (keyToBeRenewed != null) { 
                keyToBeRenewed = revokeKey(networkID, deviceNickname, keyType, 
                                           keyPassword); 
                if (keyToBeRenewed != null) { 
                    newKey = generateKey(); 
                    System.out.println("New Key =" + new String(newKey)); 
                } 
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            } 
        } catch (Exception na) { 
            System.out.println("Exception in Retriving Keys..........."); 
            na.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return newKey; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "revokeKey") 
    public byte[] revokeKey(@WebParam(name = "networkID") String networkID, 
                    @WebParam(name = "deviceNickname") String deviceNickname, 
                    @WebParam(name = "keyType") int keyType, 
                    @WebParam(name = "keyPassword") String keyPassword) { 
        byte[] key = null; 
        this.networkID = networkID; 
        this.deviceNickname = deviceNickname; 
        this.keyType = keyType; 
        this.keyPassword = keyPassword; 
        FileInputStream in = null; 
        FileOutputStream out = null; 
        byte[] keyToBeRevoked = null; 
        try { 
            makeSQL(); 
            ResultSet rs = statement.executeQuery("SELECT keyStoreAlias FROM " + 
                    "keys where deviceNickname='" + deviceNickname + 
                    "' AND keytype=" + keyType + ""); 
            if (rs.next() == true) { 
                String alias = rs.getString("keyStoreAlias"); 
                rs.close(); 
 
                if (keyStore.containsAlias(alias) == true) { 
                    keyToBeRevoked = ((KeyStore.SecretKeyEntry) 
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                            keyStore.getEntry(alias,new KeyStore.PasswordProtection 
                            (this.keyPassword.toCharArray()))).getSecretKey().getEncoded(); 
                    keyStore.deleteEntry(alias); 
                    out = new FileOutputStream(new File(keyStorePath)); 
                    keyStore.store(out, keyStorePassword.toCharArray()); 
                    out.close(); 
                    statement.executeUpdate("DELETE FROM keys where " + 
                                            "KeyStoreAlias='" + alias + "'"); 
                    System.out.println("Revoked Key Alias=" + alias); 
                } 
 
            } 
 
        } catch (Exception exc) { 
            System.out.println("Exception in Retriving Keys..........."); 
            exc.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return keyToBeRevoked; 
    } 
 
    private void makeSQL() throws SQLException, ClassNotFoundException { 
 
        if (statement != null) { 
            statement = null; 
        } 
        Class.forName("org.apache.derby.jdbc.ClientDriver"); 
        connection = DriverManager.getConnection( 
                "jdbc:derby://localhost:1527/WirelessHART;create=true"); 
        statement = connection.createStatement( 
                ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_SENSITIVE, ResultSet.CONCUR_READ_ONLY); 
 
    } 
 
    private byte[] retriveKey() { 
        try { 
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            makeSQL(); 
            ResultSet rs = statement.executeQuery("SELECT keyStoreAlias FROM " + 
                    "keys where deviceNickname='" + deviceNickname + 
                    "' AND keytype=" + keyType + ""); 
            if (rs.next() == true) { 
                String alias = rs.getString("keyStoreAlias"); 
                rs.close(); 
                boolean isTrue = keyStore.containsAlias(alias); 
                if (isTrue == true) { 
                    KeyStore.SecretKeyEntry keyEntry = (KeyStore.SecretKeyEntry)  
                            keyStore.getEntry(alias, new KeyStore.PasswordProtection 
                            (keyPassword.toCharArray())); 
                    SecretKey AESKey = keyEntry.getSecretKey(); 
                    return AESKey.getEncoded(); 
                } 
            } 
        } catch (Exception cne) { 
            cne.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return null; 
    } 
 
    private byte[] generateKey() { 
        SecretKey AESKey = null; 
        try { 
            SecureRandom sr = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG"); 
            String seed = keyPassword + System.currentTimeMillis();//Concatenate 
            MessageDigest hash = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1"); 
            hash.update(seed.getBytes());// deskewing of random source 
            sr.setSeed(hash.digest()); 
            KeyGenerator generator = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES"); 
            generator.init(128, sr); 
            AESKey = generator.generateKey(); 
            boolean storageResult = storeKey(AESKey); 
            if (storageResult == true) { 
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                return AESKey.getEncoded(); 
            } 
        } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException na) { 
            System.out.println("Exception in generating Keys..........."); 
        } 
        return null; 
    } 
 
    private boolean storeKey(SecretKey key) { 
        FileOutputStream out = null; 
 
        try { 
            out = new FileOutputStream(new File(keyStorePath)); 
            KeyStore.SecretKeyEntry keyEntry = new KeyStore.SecretKeyEntry(key); 
            String keyStoreAlias = (new String(deviceNickname)) + "_" + keyType; 
            keyStore.setEntry(keyStoreAlias, keyEntry, new KeyStore.PasswordProtection 
                    (keyPassword.toCharArray())); 
            keyStore.store(out, keyStorePassword.toCharArray()); 
            out.close(); 
 
            makeSQL(); 
            statement.executeUpdate("insert into KEYS values('" + keyStoreAlias +  
                    "','" + deviceNickname +"','" + networkID + "'," + 
                    keyType + ",'" + new Date(System.currentTimeMillis()) + 
                    "','" + new Date(System.currentTimeMillis() + 5000) + "')"); 
            return true; 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            System.out.println("Exception in Storing Keys..........."); 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return false; 
    } 
}  
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2. WirelessHARTCA Service: 
/* 
 * This service is provided to secure the wired/core part of the WirelessHART 
 * Network. Any wired device can access this service. 
 */ 
package sics.shahid.ca; 
 
import javax.jws.WebMethod; 
import javax.jws.WebParam; 
import javax.jws.WebService; 
import java.security.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
import java.security.cert.Certificate; 
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate; 
import java.util.Date; 
import java.util.Random; 
import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal; 
import org.bouncycastle.jce.PKCS10CertificationRequest; 
import org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider; 
import org.bouncycastle.x509.X509V1CertificateGenerator; 
import java.sql.Connection; 
import java.sql.DriverManager; 
import java.sql.ResultSet; 
import java.sql.Statement; 
import java.util.Enumeration; 
import sics.shahid.additional.Messages; 
 
/** 
 * 
 * @author Shahid 
 */ 
@WebService() 
public class WirelessHARTCA implements Messages { 
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    Statement statement = null; 
    boolean loginStat = false; 
 
    /** 
     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "adminLogin") 
    public String adminLogin(@WebParam(name = "username") String username, @WebParam(name = 
"password") String password) { 
        makeSQL(); 
        try { 
            MessageDigest hash = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1"); 
            hash.update(password.getBytes()); 
            String hashedPassword = new String(hash.digest()); 
 
            ResultSet rs = statement.executeQuery("select * from SECADMIN"); 
            if (rs.next() == false) { 
                rs.close(); 
                statement.executeUpdate("insert into SECADMIN values('" + username + "','" + hashedPassword 
+ "')"); 
                return SUCCESS; 
            } 
            ResultSet res = statement.executeQuery("select * from SECADMIN where USERNAME='" + 
username + "' and PASSWORD='" + hashedPassword + "'"); 
            if (res.next() == true) { 
                res.close(); 
                loginStat = true; 
                return SUCCESS; 
            } else { 
                return PASSWORD_MSG; 
            } 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
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        return ERROR_MSG; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "certRequest") 
    public String certRequest(@WebParam(name = "name") String name, @WebParam(name = "email") 
String email, @WebParam(name = "certAlias") String certAlias) { 
        makeSQL(); 
        try { 
            statement.executeUpdate("insert into REQUEST_CERT values('" + name + "','" + email + "','" + 
certAlias + "')"); 
            return CONFIRM_MSG; 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return ERROR_MSG; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "signCertificate") 
    public String signCertificate(@WebParam(name = "requesterDN") String requesterDN, 
@WebParam(name = "requesterKsPath") String requesterKsPath, @WebParam(name = 
"requesterKsPass") String requesterKsPass, @WebParam(name = "requesterCertAlias") String 
requesterCertAlias, @WebParam(name = "requesterKeyAlias") String requesterKeyAlias, 
@WebParam(name = "requesterkeyPass") String requesterkeyPass, @WebParam(name = 
"signerCertAlias") String signerCertAlias, @WebParam(name = "signerKeyAlias") String signerKeyAlias, 
@WebParam(name = "signerKeyPass") String signerKeyPass, @WebParam(name = "signerKsPath") String 
signerKsPath, @WebParam(name = "signerKsPass") String signerKsPass) { 
        if (loginStat == false) { 
            return LOGIN_MSG; 
        } 
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        FileInputStream signerIn = null, requesterIn = null; 
        FileOutputStream signerOut = null, requesterOut = null; 
        ; 
        try { 
 
            KeyStore signerKS = KeyStore.getInstance("JKS"); 
            KeyStore requesterKS = KeyStore.getInstance("JKS"); 
            signerIn = new FileInputStream(signerKsPath); 
            requesterIn = new FileInputStream(requesterKsPath); 
            signerKS.load(signerIn, signerKsPass.toCharArray()); 
            requesterKS.load(requesterIn, requesterKsPass.toCharArray()); 
            signerIn.close(); 
            requesterIn.close(); 
            X509Certificate CACert = (X509Certificate) signerKS.getCertificate(signerKeyAlias); 
            if (CACert == null) { 
                CACert = (X509Certificate) signerKS.getCertificate(signerCertAlias); 
                if (CACert == null) { 
                    Enumeration en = signerKS.aliases(); 
                    String data = "Start>>>"; 
                    while (en.hasMoreElements()) { 
                        data = data + "; " + (String) en.nextElement(); 
                    } 
                    return "No CA found except: " + data; 
                } 
            } 
            X509V1CertificateGenerator certGenerator = new X509V1CertificateGenerator(); 
            certGenerator.setSerialNumber(BigInteger.valueOf(System.currentTimeMillis())); 
            certGenerator.setIssuerDN(CACert.getSubjectX500Principal()); 
            certGenerator.setNotBefore(new Date(System.currentTimeMillis())); 
            certGenerator.setNotAfter(new Date(System.currentTimeMillis() + (1000 * 60 * 60 * 24 * 60))); 
            KeyPair newPair = generateKeyPair(); 
            PKCS10CertificationRequest req = new PKCS10CertificationRequest("SHA256WithRSA", 
                    new X500Principal(requesterDN), newPair.getPublic(), null, newPair.getPrivate()); 
           certGenerator.setSubjectDN(req.getCertificationRequestInfo().getSubject()); 
KTH/SICS/ABB | WirelessHART Security 95 
 
            if (Security.getProvider("BC") == null) { 
                Security.addProvider(new BouncyCastleProvider()); 
            } 
            certGenerator.setPublicKey(req.getPublicKey("BC")); 
            certGenerator.setSignatureAlgorithm("SHA256WithRSAEncryption"); 
            X509Certificate signedCertificate = certGenerator.generateX509Certificate((PrivateKey) 
signerKS.getKey(signerKeyAlias, signerKeyPass.toCharArray())); 
            Certificate[] newChain = {signedCertificate}; 
            Random ran = new Random(); 
            String temp = ran.nextInt() + "raza";//Must be changed later..... 
            String CN = getCN(requesterDN); 
 
            requesterKS.setKeyEntry(requesterKeyAlias, newPair.getPrivate(), temp.toCharArray(), newChain); 
            requesterOut = new FileOutputStream(requesterKsPath); 
            requesterKS.setCertificateEntry(requesterCertAlias, signedCertificate); 
            requesterKS.store(requesterOut, requesterKsPass.toCharArray()); 
            return " Common Name (CN) = " + CN + 
                    "; Certificate Alias = " + requesterCertAlias + 
                    "; PrivateKey Alias = " + requesterKeyAlias + 
                    "; Private Key Password = " + temp + 
                    "; Storage Name = " + requesterKsPath + 
                    "; Signed By = " + CACert.getIssuerX500Principal().getName() + 
                    "; Please change the key password using keytool..."; 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return ERROR_MSG; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "createCertificate") 
    public String createCertificate(@WebParam(name = "CU") String CU, @WebParam(name = "OU") String 
OU, @WebParam(name = "O") String O, @WebParam(name = "L") String L, @WebParam(name = "ST") 
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String ST, @WebParam(name = "C") String C, @WebParam(name = "validity") long validity, 
@WebParam(name = "email") String email, @WebParam(name = "ksName") String ksName, 
@WebParam(name = "ksPath") String ksPath, @WebParam(name = "ksPass") String ksPass) { 
        if (loginStat == false) { 
            return LOGIN_MSG; 
        } 
 
        try { 
            MessageDigest hash = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1"); 
            hash.update(ksPass.getBytes()); 
            String hashedPassword = new String(hash.digest()); 
            makeSQL(); 
            ResultSet res = statement.executeQuery("select * from KEYSTORES where NAME='" + ksName + "' 
and PASSWORD='" + hashedPassword + "'"); 
            if (res.next() == false) { 
                res.close(); 
                return PASSWORD_MSG; 
            } 
            String path = ksPath + ksName + ".jks"; 
            X500Principal principal = new X500Principal( 
                    "CN=" + CU + 
                    ", OU=" + OU + 
                    ", O=" + O + 
                    ", L=" + L + 
                    ", ST=" + ST + 
                    ", C=" + C); 
 
            KeyPair pair = generateKeyPair(); 
            PublicKey pubKey = null; 
            FileOutputStream out = null; 
 
            X509V1CertificateGenerator certGenerator = new X509V1CertificateGenerator(); 
            certGenerator.setSerialNumber(BigInteger.valueOf(System.currentTimeMillis())); 
            certGenerator.setIssuerDN(principal); 
            certGenerator.setNotBefore(new Date(System.currentTimeMillis())); 
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            certGenerator.setNotAfter(new Date(System.currentTimeMillis() + validity)); 
            certGenerator.setSubjectDN(principal); 
            if ((pubKey = pair.getPublic()) != null) { 
                certGenerator.setPublicKey(pubKey); 
            } 
            certGenerator.setSignatureAlgorithm("SHA256WithRSAEncryption"); 
 
            if (Security.getProvider("BC") == null) { 
                Security.addProvider(new BouncyCastleProvider()); 
            } 
            X509Certificate certCA = certGenerator.generateX509Certificate(pair.getPrivate(), "BC"); 
            Certificate chain[] = new Certificate[1]; 
            chain[0] = certCA; 
            FileInputStream in = null; 
            KeyStore ks = ks = KeyStore.getInstance("JKS"); 
            in = new FileInputStream(path); 
            ks.load(in, ksPass.toCharArray()); 
            Random ran = new Random(); 
            String pkPass = ran.nextInt() + "Shahid"; 
            ks.setKeyEntry(CU, pair.getPrivate(), pkPass.toCharArray(), chain); 
            out = new FileOutputStream(path); 
            ks.setCertificateEntry(CU + "Cert", certCA); 
            ks.store(out, ksPass.toCharArray()); 
            return " Self Signed Certificate Created for = " + certCA.getIssuerX500Principal().getName() + 
                    "; PrivateKey Alias=" + CU + 
                    "; Private Key Password=" + pkPass + 
                    "; Storage Name = " + path + 
                    "; \nPlease change the key password..."; 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return ERROR_MSG; 
    } 
 
    /** 
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     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "exploreJKS") 
    public String exploreJKS(@WebParam(name = "ksName") String ksName, @WebParam(name = 
"ksPass") String ksPass) { 
        KeyStore ks = null; 
        String allAlias = null; 
        try { 
            FileInputStream in = new FileInputStream(ksName); 
            if (ksName.indexOf(".jceks") != -1) { 
                ks = KeyStore.getInstance("JCEKS"); 
                allAlias = "Aliases (DeviceNickname_KeyType)"; 
            } else { 
                ks = KeyStore.getInstance("JKS"); 
                allAlias = "Key and Cert Aliases"; 
            } 
 
            ks.load(in, ksPass.toCharArray()); 
            in.close(); 
            Enumeration en = ks.aliases(); 
            while (en.hasMoreElements()) { 
                allAlias = allAlias + "; " + (String) en.nextElement(); 
            } 
            return allAlias; 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return ERROR_MSG; 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * Web service operation 
     */ 
    @WebMethod(operationName = "createSecureStorage") 
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    public String createSecureStorage(@WebParam(name = "storageName") String storageName, 
@WebParam(name = "storageLocation") String storageLocation, @WebParam(name = 
"storagePassword") String storagePassword, @WebParam(name = "storageType") String storageType) { 
        statement = null; 
        if (loginStat == false) { 
            return LOGIN_MSG; 
        } 
        KeyStore newStore = null; 
        try { 
 
            String path = storageLocation + storageName + storageType; 
            FileOutputStream fileOut = new FileOutputStream(new File(path)); 
            if (storageType.equals(".jceks")) { 
                newStore = KeyStore.getInstance("JCEKS"); 
            } else { 
                newStore = KeyStore.getInstance("JKS"); 
            } 
            newStore.load(null, null); 
            newStore.store(fileOut, storagePassword.toCharArray()); 
            fileOut.close(); 
            makeSQL(); 
            MessageDigest hash2 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-1"); 
            hash2.update(storagePassword.getBytes()); 
            String hashedPassword = new String(hash2.digest()); 
            statement.executeUpdate("insert into KEYSTORES values('" + storageName + "','" + storageLocation 
+ "','" + hashedPassword + "')"); 
            return SUCCESS; 
        } catch (Exception kse) { 
            kse.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return ERROR_MSG; 
    } 
 
    private KeyPair generateKeyPair() { 
        try { 
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            if (Security.getProvider("BC") == null) { 
                Security.addProvider(new BouncyCastleProvider()); 
            } 
            KeyPairGenerator generator = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("RSA", "BC"); 
            generator.initialize(2048, new SecureRandom()); 
            return generator.genKeyPair(); 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return null; 
    } 
 
    private void makeSQL() { 
        if (statement != null) { 
            return; 
        } 
        try { 
            Class.forName("org.apache.derby.jdbc.ClientDriver"); 
            Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection( 
                    "jdbc:derby://localhost:1527/WirelessHART;create=true"); 
            statement = connection.createStatement( 
                    ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_SENSITIVE, ResultSet.CONCUR_READ_ONLY); 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
    } 
 
    private String getCN(String DN) { 
        String CN = null; 
        try { 
 
            String newDN[] = DN.split(","); 
            int index = newDN[0].indexOf("CN="); 
            CN = newDN[0].substring(index + 3, newDN[0].length()); 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
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            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return CN; 
    } 
} 
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